Young Man's Fancy: Enlightenment Taxonomy and the Feminization of the Free Musical Fantasia by Weinstein-Reiman, Michael
 
 
 
 
 
YOUNG MAN’S FANCY: ENLIGHTENMENT TAXONOMY AND THE  
 
FEMINIZATION OF THE FREE MUSICAL FANTASIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
MICHAEL D. WEINSTEIN-REIMAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS 
 
Presented to the School of Music and Dance 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
June 2014 
 
 ii 
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Michael D. Weinstein-Reiman 
 
Title: Young Man’s Fancy: Enlightenment Taxonomy and the Feminization of the Free  
Musical Fantasia 
 
This thesis has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the Master of Arts degree in the School of Music and Dance by: 
 
Roger Grant   Chair 
Lori Kruckenberg  Member 
Stephen Rodgers  Member 
 
and 
 
Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research and Innovation; 
 Dean of the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright 2014 Michael D. Weinstein-Reiman 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv 
THESIS ABSTRACT 
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Title: Young Man’s Fancy: Enlightenment Taxonomy and the Feminization of the Free  
Musical Fantasia 
  
 
In this thesis, I explicate the linkage between gender and the phenomenology of 
musical extemporaneity in the Enlightenment. In so doing, I trace the development of the 
free musical fantasia from its improvisatory roots in the music of courtesans to its 
codification as a Baroque topos and its eighteenth-century classification in the treatises of 
philosophers and music theorists. Enlightenment discourses on the free fantasia coincide 
with the emergence of the fantastic as a literary genre. This association manifests in the 
construction of the idea of “feminine music as other,” signified by an infatuation with 
technology, the exhibition of talented female performers and automatons in these 
narratives, and the awareness of the subconscious as a viable wellspring of creative ideas. 
As such, the urge to rationalize musical expression at this time may be interpreted as an 
acknowledgement of the limits of Classical semiotics around the year 1800.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In Jacques Cazotte’s fantasy narrative Le Diable amoureux (The Devil in Love) 
from 1772, the protagonist Alvaro—a naïve and well-meaning youth turned amateur 
necromancer—conjures the devil in an attempt to impress his older compatriots with his 
desire for an understanding of the supernatural. The devil takes the form of a beautiful 
female musician, a Roman improvvisatrice who, in turn, captivates with her artistic 
agility and femininity. It should be noted, however, that the improvvisatrice’s charms are 
not only summoned by the imagination of the male protagonist, but also objectified and 
consumed by an audience of pleasure-seeking male voyeurs. “She takes her harp,” writes 
Cazotte,  
She preludes with a small, longish and plump hand, at once pale and purple, on 
which the fingers, rounded at the tips, are finished by a nail almost inconceivable 
in form and grace; we were all surprised, and believed to be present at a most 
delectable concert.1   
 
Later in the novel, the devil—now christened Biondetta—becomes Alvaro’s 
consort. Near the end of the narrative, seated at a harpsichord that she has built, Biondetta 
improvises, swept away in a dreamlike state as the unwitting object of Alvaro’s gaze 
through a keyhole. In both of these instances, Cazotte signifies the acts of Biondetta’s 
music making as extemporaneous, indicating that she “preludes” or that, in fact, her 
                                                
1 “Elle prélude avec une petite main longuette, potelée, tout à la fois blanche et purpurine, dont les doigts 
insensiblement arrondis par le bout, étoient terminés par un ongle dont la forme et la grâce étoient 
inconcevables; nous étions tous surpris, nous croyions être au plus délicieux concert.” Jacques Cazotte, Le 
Diable amoureux (Paris, 1772), 25. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. 
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music book is closed during her performance.2 Musical improvisation in the novel is, in a 
sense, reinterpreted as feminine display created for male consumption. Biondetta’s public 
performance is offered to the reader as Alvaro imagines it and creates it from his 
subconscious, while her private one could not exist in the literary paradigm without 
Alvaro—and the reader—as witnesses, if not voyeurs. 
By examining select writings in literature and music theory from the eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries, I seek to explicate the ways in which gender and musical 
improvisation were often linked during the Enlightenment. In so doing, I trace the 
development of the free musical fantasia from its earliest codification as a quasi-
improvisational genre to its classification as a musical topos already in seventeenth-
century music theory.3 The emergence of the fantastic literary narrative in the late-
eighteenth century—and the genre’s frequent depiction of extemporaneous musical 
performances by women—invites further investigation into the connection between these 
tales, improvisation, and gender. Cazotte’s Le Diable amoureux, a prototype for the 
literary fantastic, and E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann (1816), widely considered a 
quintessential example of the genre, together serve as a point of reflection in my analysis. 
As case studies, the bewitching musical displays of Cazotte’s Biondetta and Hoffmann’s 
Olimpia underscore the link between the changing conception of the free fantasia and the 
appearance of fantasy novels around the year 1800. This association manifests vis-à-vis 
                                                
2 “Elle avoit devant elle un livre fermé sur le pupitre. Elle prélude et chante à demi-voix en 
s'accompagnant.” “She had before her a closed book on the music stand. She preludes and sings in a 
whisper while accompanying herself.” Jacques Cazotte, Le Diable amoureux, 78. 
 
3 See Leonard Ratner, Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style (New York: Schirmer, 1980), and V. 
Kofi Agawu, Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991). 
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the construction of the idea of “feminine music as other,” signified by an infatuation with 
technology, the exhibition of exceptionally musically talented female performers and 
automatons in these narratives, and the increasing awareness of the existence of the 
psychological subconscious as a legitimate wellspring of creative, musical ideas. In what 
follows, I posit that the academic urge to rationalize and quantify free musical expression 
at this time might be taken as a reaction against the encroaching sentimentality, 
Empfindsamkeit, or even femininity of the Romantic period. While others have pointed to 
a vast corpus of nineteenth-century musical, literary, and theoretical material often 
associated with the fantastic, Gothic, or even uncanny, I am mainly concerned here with 
musical fantasy as representation within a complex system of early-modern semiotics.! 
The epistemological reconfiguration initiated by the Enlightenment thus reveals a 
generation of eighteenth-century thinkers at pains to understand free musical expression, 
inherently non-representational, alongside the acknowledgment of the limits of Classical 
signification. These unsettling ideas converge in literary portrayals of women making 
music at the dawn of the nineteenth century.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
4 See Francesca Brittan, “On Microscopic Hearing: Fairy Magic, Natural Science, and the Scherzo 
fantastique,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 64:3 (Fall 2011): 527–600, and Marianna 
Ritchey, “Echoes of the Guillotine: Berlioz and the French Fantastic,” 19th-Century Music 34:2 (Fall 2010): 
168–185. 
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CHAPTER II 
NOTATION AND A RENAISSANCE EPISTEMOLOGICAL QUANDARY 
 
Before embarking on a full-scale investigation of where and how the notions of 
extemporaneous music making and femininity intersect, it is necessary to examine the 
subtleties that distinguish “fantasia” from “improvisation” and the terms’ respective 
categorizations in the Enlightenment. In this section, I trace the origins of the fantastic 
topos to the emergence of printed music in the late fifteenth century—a cultural 
reconfiguration that relegated unnotated music to a liminal metaphysical space.   
Johannes Tinctoris’s 1477 Liber de arte contrapuncti engenders a discourse 
around somewhat vexing terminology for two supposedly opposed compositional tactics: 
res facta (or “made thing”) and cantare super librum (alternately super librum cantare, 
or “singing upon the book”). Several scholars have evoked Tinctoris’s treatise in an 
attempt to wrest from it fifteenth-century analogues for the modern terms “composition” 
and “improvisation.” The much-contested passage begins:   
1. That counterpoint, both simple and diminished is made in two ways, that is, in 
writing or in the mind, and how resfacta [sic.] differs from counterpoint. 2. 
Furthermore, counterpoint both simple and diminished, is made in two ways, that 
is, either in writing or in the mind. 3. Counterpoint that is written is commonly 
called resfacta. 4. But that which we make together mentally we call counterpoint 
in the [absolute] sense, and they who do this are vulgarly said to sing upon the 
book.5  
                                                
5 Johannes Tinctoris, Liber de arte contrapuncti (1477), in Opera theoretica, Albert Seay, ed., Corpus 
scriptorum de musica, XXII (Rome, 1975). Original Latin: “Quod tam simplex quam diminutus 
contrapunctus dupliciter fit, hoc est scripto vel mente, et in quo res facta a contrapuncto differt. Porro tam 
simplex quam diminutus contrapunctus dupliciter fit, hoc est aut scripto aut mente. Contrapunctus qui 
scripto fit communiter res facta nominatur. At istum quem mentaliter conficimus absolute contrapunctum 
vocamus, et hunc qui faciunt super librum cantare vulgariter dicuntur.” English translation in Margaret 
Bent, “‘Resfacta’ and ‘Cantare Super Librum,’” Journal of the American Musicological Society 36:3 
(Autumn 1983): 373.  
 
 
 
5 
The difficulties with this passage are manifold and pertain to the translation of 
Tinctoris’s somewhat unclear terminology. Attending to Coussemaker’s nineteenth-
century translation of these quizzical terms, Ernest Ferand notes, “What strikes us in 
these definitions of res facta is the absence of any allusion to its supposedly characteristic 
feature … that it is a written, not improvised counterpoint.” Ferand later concludes, “[Res 
facta] may mean either a written contrapuntal composition, plain or florid, as 
distinguished from improvised counterpoint, either simple or florid; or it may mean 
florid, in contradistinction to simple, counterpoint, whether written or improvised.”6 It is 
via the term “chose faite”—a vernacular analogue for res facta excavated from a French 
translation of Jean Calvin’s sixteenth-century Institutio Christianae religionis—that 
Ferand generalizes cantare super librum (translated in very loose form as “musique 
rompue”) as florid counterpoint, surely extemporized. Ferand leaves the issue of res facta 
itself regrettably untidy; what emerges from his account, however, is a compression of 
associations that undermines the broader epistemological context of Tinctoris’s treatise.  
Writing in 1968 in response to Ferand, Ruth Harras notes,  
The Musique rompue is a Particular of the chose faite which is the broader term 
including, no doubt, among its demonstrations, transference from the Vocal 
Intrinsic to the Instrumental Extrinsic. Any number of Particulars can and do 
result from this secondary Universal chose faite … hence, res facta interpreted as 
the visible work, i.e., written down, and more likely to be written down because 
of the necessity owing to man-made complexities and elaborations inherent in 
“Art.”7  
 
                                                
6 Ernest Ferand, “What is ‘Res Facta’?” Journal of the American Musicological Society 10:3 (Autumn 
1957): 143. 
 
7 Ruth Hannas, “Humanistic Light on ‘What is Res Facta?’” Revue belge de Musicologie / Belgisch 
Tijdschrift voor Muziekwetenschap 22:1 (1968): 60. 
 
 
 
6 
One observes the Aristotelian logic implicit in Hannas’s pairing of res facta and 
cantare super librum, a metaphysics appreciable in the Middle Ages and into the 
Renaissance. However, this universal-particular construction plays out in our 
contemporary understanding of notation as a compositional sine qua non: reading “man-
made complexities” into res facta necessarily aligns the term with our post-nineteenth-
century concept of the musical work, and its opposition to music fully-formed yet 
generated ex tempore.  
In her own response to Ferand from 1983, Margaret Bent addresses this modern 
distinction, suggesting that written counterpoint in the fifteenth century and earlier—that 
prefigured “in the mind” and orally transmitted, and that extemporized “on the book”—
should be considered on a continuum of musical achievement.8 “At no point,” Bent 
writes, “is there any suggestion that singing super librum may be any less rigorous than 
composition, except in the distinguishing feature that allows contrapuncti to accord only 
with the tenor and not necessarily with each other.”9 While Bent notes that, in fact, “there 
is little in the vocabulary of music theory before 1500 to encourage ‘improvisatory’ 
interpretations of words such as ‘mental’ and ‘singing,’”10 her argument is nevertheless 
delimited by her own epistemology: it is the elevation of cantare super librum to the 
plane of notated composition that normalizes its assumed irregularity. In her view, 
singing upon the book is “a carefully-structured procedure” and “a far cry from the 
unpremeditated, collective improvisation we have been led to understand by modern 
                                                
8 Bent, “‘Resfacta’ and ‘Cantare Super Librum,’” 378. 
 
9 Ibid., 386. 
 
10 Ibid., 375. 
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writers.”11 Music’s aesthetics rather than its practice become in Bent’s analysis a modern 
cultural graft onto early-modern music theory. 
Writing in response to Bent in 1996, Rob C. Wegman resituates the res facta 
debate within the fifteenth century:  
At the root of Tinctoris’s perception lies the Aristotelian distinction between 
making (poiesis) and doing (praxis). Music, by definition, belongs to the latter 
category. To “make” is to produce a piece of work, an object, and sound is not an 
object, but motion. … To think of music as a “thing” is a paradox: things have 
permanence and spatial extension, and for sound this is unthinkable unless it is 
represented by ink on paper, thus assuming matter and form.12  
 
Indeed, considered broadly, cantare super librum is by its very nature a signifier of 
action—a verb (in infinitive form followed by a preposition and the object of the 
preposition)—and is well understood within the paradigm of Aristotelian metaphysics to 
connote motion rather than matter.13 
The goal of my short précis of scholarship related to Tinctoris’s terms res facta 
and cantare super librum is not to solve a problem, but rather to highlight an 
epistemological quandary, one likely shared by the theorist himself. Music—by its very 
nature impermanent, evinced by a medieval Aristotelian metaphysics—is curiously 
linked to the development of print in the Renaissance. While musical notation in 
manuscript form predates Tinctoris’s Liber de arte by many centuries, I argue that the 
increasing accessibility of printed music in the fifteenth century demanded a 
                                                
11 Ibid., 387. 
 
12 Rob C. Wegman, “From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low 
Countries, 1450-1500,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 49:3 (Autumn 1996): 439. 
 
13 “[Rules of counterpoint] were learned by young singers for the purpose of improvisation, and following 
them would have been as natural as speaking in grammatically correct sentences.” For a full discussion of 
the association of counterpoint rules with the immediacy of grammar in the Middle Ages, see Peter 
Schubert, “Counterpoint Pedagogy in the Renaissance,” in The Cambridge History of Western Music 
Theory, ed. Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 503.  
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reassessment of music’s phenomenology. But if Tinctoris grappled with the notion of 
written music as a res facta, or “made thing,” what might be said about music 
extemporized “on the book,” only partially written?  
Crucially, this reassessment plays out in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century 
discourses on polyphony and its improvisatory pedigree. As Bonnie Blackburn and others 
have shown, at the core of the hostility surrounding polyphony’s infiltration into solemn, 
ecclesiastical affairs is the long-standing assessment of polyphonic music as a largely 
unwritten and “singerly” procedure, with Tinctoris’s cantare super librum growing out of 
the traditions of organum and fauxbourdon.14 Both praised for its sweetness and 
disparaged for its beguiling qualities, polyphony emerges in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries as a battleground for sparring musicians and theologians. Similarly, Lydia 
Goehr reminds us that as early as 1324 “Pope John XXII issued a bull forbidding the use 
of new music in the mass. ‘Originality,’ he had decided, ‘encourages effeminacy in 
descant, a rushing on without rest, and an intoxication of the ear without the healing of 
the soul.’”15 In 1491, Ficino’s print of Plato’s dialogues “affirmed the great power of 
music, but recognized its immense dangers to the moral fabric of society, as well as to the 
welfare of its citizens.”16 By the sixteenth century, we will see, the “dangers” of musical 
complexity—as literal and figurative representation—became conflated with matters 
extrinsic to notation, including virtuosic display and, ultimately, femininity.  
                                                
14 Bonnie J. Blackburn, “On Compositional Process in the Fifteenth Century,” Journal of the American 
Musicological Society 40:2 (Summer 1987): 258. 
 
15 Lydia Goehr, The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 135. 
 
16 Rob C. Wegman. The Crisis of Music in Early Modern Europe 1470-1530 (New York: Routledge, 2008), 
19. 
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With the preceding survey of scholarship, I have shown how a reexamination of 
music’s metaphysics in the fifteenth century initiated an early-modern epistemological 
quandary, by which extemporaneity was transformed from a compositional tactic into a 
perplexing, even aberrant phenomenon. Although facets of Tinctoris’s description of 
cantare super librum are familiar as what we might categorize as improvisatory (much 
like ornamentation, division, the applications of musica ficta) the notion that emotion was 
at all integral to the process is an anachronistic one. In the following section, I investigate 
the compression of musical ex tempore and early-modern cognition. This new 
formulation of ideas came to signify in some manner the idea of virtuosic instrumental 
performance from memory, in free time, with adventurous harmony and passagework. It 
is in the cultivation and transmutation of a seventeenth-century free musical fantasia 
topos that we may begin to elucidate the intersection of compositional extemporaneity 
with musical subjectivity and, in turn, to unpack the link between this style and 
sentiment, genius, and femininity.    
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CHAPTER III 
THE BAROQUE: AFFECT AND THE STYLUS FANTASTICUS 
 
The codification of the free musical fantasia topos in the Baroque is directly 
related to early-modern structures for knowledge and feeling. The modern concepts of 
compositional ingenuity or imagination thus find concordances in seventeenth-century 
discourses on emotion, and by extension, their meaning within a complex system of 
representations. Significantly, this transfiguration of the fantastic topos occurs 
contemporaneously with doctrines that attempted to unlock a universal mathesis of 
music, and culminates in the proliferation of the Figurenlehre, the Affektenlehre, and 
related music-theoretical traditions. Prefigured most notably by René Descartes in the 
Compendium musicae (1618; published in 1650) and Les Passions de l’âme (1649), and 
later amplified and disseminated by a host of eighteenth-century composer-pedagogues, 
this reconfiguration of music-theoretical thought is closely aligned with the revitalization 
and reification of Classical aesthetics in the representational episteme.17   
In this section, I highlight the emergence of an early-modern listener—a musical 
subject—in conjunction with a generalized dramaturgical application of rhetorical study 
and practice across nearly all artistic disciplines, and a widespread philosophical 
positioning along an empiricism-rationalism axis. Documents that might be defined as 
belonging to the discursive practice of the Affektenlehre, including Athanasius Kircher’s 
Musurgia universalis (1650) and Johann Mattheson’s Der vollkommene Capellmeister 
                                                
17 René Descartes, Compendium of Music, trans. Walter Robert (American Institute of Musicology, 1961); 
Les Passions de l'âme (Paris: Henry Le Gras, 1649). 
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(1739), presented here as a paired study, serve as exponents of Cartesian reasoning. As 
such, the Affektenlehre might also signal a paradigm shift: the locus of human sensibility 
falls prey to a universal mathesis of understanding, the rise of the Classical sign, and a 
nascent taxonomic tradition. Broadly stated, the spectrum of human emotions is 
transformed from an inner-driven phenomenon to an assumed uniformity that could, 
theoretically, be imposed from without. Musical fantasy is brought into relief by and in 
opposition to this burgeoning epistemological propensity to classify, which Michel 
Foucault summarized as a meta-linguistic and ontological phenomenon.18  
Descartes’ Compendium musicae is a useful, albeit unusual point of departure in a 
brief genealogy of affect. Written for his friend Isaac Beeckman and given to him as a 
gift in 1618, the Compendium was only published posthumously in 1650, and therefore 
presents as a curious anachronism when considered to post-date the philosophe’s widely 
read Meditations and Les Passions de l’âme. Nevertheless, an analysis of the 
Compendium reveals it to be an attempt at a synthesis of musica speculativa—likely 
inherited by Descartes from Gaffurius—and an early-modern, deductive rationalism."# 
Paradoxically, Cartesian dualism is manifest in this construction of early-modern sensus 
vis-à-vis affect and the musical subject.20 In Descartes, then, the subject becomes a 
curious amalgam of sensus and ratio, with speculative geometry delicately embroidered 
onto early-seventeenth-century discourses on perception and cognition. 
                                                
18 “The process of naming will be based not upon what one sees, but upon elements that have already been 
introduced into discourse by structure. It is a matter of constructing a secondary language based upon that 
primary, but certain universal, language.” Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994), 139. 
 
19 Franchinus Gaffurius, Practica musicae (Milan: Gulielmum signer Rothomagensem, 1496). 
 
20 I use the term “musical subject” in concordance with Jairo Moreno’s usage. See Musical 
Representations, Subjects, and Objects (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). 
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Descartes begins his Compendium not with an explanation of the monochord or 
the definition of terms, but an assessment of sense: “The basis of music is sound; its aim 
is to please and to arouse various emotions in us.”21 This statement is provocative in a 
number of ways, chief among them a reassessment of what music could and should do. 
Throughout Antiquity, the chief aim of music, at least according to some who attempted 
to theorize it, was to incite moral probity and religious devotion in its listeners. Emotions 
were extrinsic collateral damage to this communal responsibility, and ultimately 
necessitated containment, or at the very least, a careful understanding of their 
deployment. As early as the fifth century, Boethius noted: 
Plato prescribed that boys must not be trained in all modes but only in those 
which are vigorous and simple. Moreover, it should be especially remembered 
that if some melody or mode is altered in some way, even if this alteration is only 
the slightest change, the fresh change will not be immediately noticed; but after 
some time it will cause a great difference and will sink down through the ears into 
the soul itself. Thus Plato held that the state ought to see that only music of the 
highest moral character and prudence by composed, and that it should be modest, 
simple and masculine, rather than effeminate, violent or fickle.22 
 
Boethius’ explanation of music’s effect on human emotion relies heavily on 
apocrypha and mimesis: “violent or fickle” melodies are ostensibly “theatrical” or 
“lascivious” provocations because history (i.e. Plato) tells us it is so. By contrast, in the 
Compendium, Descartes situates music in a liminal space between sensus and ratio, soul 
and body. He writes,  
The means to this end [pleasure], i.e. the attributes of sound, are principally two: 
namely, its difference of duration or time, and its differences of tension from high 
                                                
21 Descartes, Compendium, 11. 
 
22 Severinus Boethius, De Institutione Musica, Book 1, trans. Calvin Bower, “Boethius’ The Principles of 
Music, an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary” (Ph.D. diss., George Peabody College for Teachers, 
1967).  
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to low. The quality of tone itself (from what body and by what means it emanates 
in the most pleasing manner) is the domain of the physicist.23  
 
By divesting music of its mimetic mantle, Descartes commands a rationalist stance on 
music’s effect on the emotions. Rather than situating music within the paradigm of 
Platonic ethics,24 the Compendium instead defines music as an object in dialogue with a 
thinking and feeling subject. Jairo Moreno reads this reification of music’s meaning in 
Descartes’ brief treatise as an epistemological bellwether—a pivotal move away from a 
medieval metaphysics of resemblance and toward a philosophy that traded in measurable 
phenomena, signs, and representations.25  
This shift, however, uncovers a contradiction. By Descartes’ estimation, to be 
moved by music is to perceive and to process, a function contemporary scholars might 
label as cognition. (Descartes continually refers to “the soul” as the locus of this process.) 
Furthermore, Descartes explicates early-modern cognition as belonging to “the domain of 
the physicist,” citing easily perceived mathematical proportions as the cause of 
pleasurable sensibility. This mathesis stands in stark contrast to the philosophe’s efforts 
throughout the essay to ascribe physicality to music’s effect on the emotions. He writes,  
Few are aware how in music with diminution, employing many voices, this time 
division is brought to the listener’s attention without the use of measures; this, I 
say, is accomplished in vocal music by stronger breathing and on instruments by 
stronger pressure, so that at the beginning of each measure the sound is produced 
more distinctly; singers and instrumentalists observe this instinctively, especially 
in connection with tunes to which we are accustomed to dance and sway.26 
                                                
23 Descartes, Compendium, 11. 
 
24 On Plato and the ethical regime, see Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the 
Sensible, trans. Gabriel Rockhill (London and New York: Continuum, 2004).  
 
25 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 85–127. 
 
26 Descartes, Compendium, 14. 
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With the introduction of the notions of musical instinct and physicality into the discourse 
(indeed, what Amy Cimini underscores as the document’s investment in the “materiality” 
of sound), Descartes’ Compendium curiously intertwines mind and body in a fraught 
dualism.27 As such, the Compendium itself limns a space between ratio and sensus, with 
the emergent, listening musical subject caught precariously between the two ideas. The 
legacy of medieval music theory—amplified by the author’s mathesis—looms large as 
the backdrop upon which Descartes projects an early-modern concept of feeling. 
 Works of seventeenth-century music theory, like Descartes’ Compendium, are 
characterized by a synthesis of ratio and sensus, out of which emerges the concept of 
early-modern cognition and a separation of mind and body. This Cartesian dualism 
manifests in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century proliferation of the Affektenlehre—
documents that attempted in some way a rationalized classification of irrational human 
sensibility. In what follows, I show how these early-modern conceptualizations of 
listening and feeling presage a reconfiguration of the structures for knowledge that 
characterized the representational episteme. 
Merely leafing through the pages of Kircher’s massive and lively Musurgia is 
itself an almost exhausting endeavor. Comprising ten books divided into two large tomes, 
the Musurgia is an expansive text, covering an astonishing array of musical and natural 
phenomena, the ruminations on which are offered in an elaborate, though puzzling 
taxonomy.28 In the first book, “Anatomicus de Natura soni et vocis” (Anatomy of Natural 
                                                
27 Amy Cimini, “Baruch Spinoza and the Matter of Music: Toward a New Practice of Theorizing Musical 
Bodies” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2011), 118. 
 
28 Paul Collins indicates the affections as a unifying force behind Kircher’s seemingly disorganized 
taxonomy, a provocative underscoring of the paradoxically dualist musical subject emergent in the 
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Sounds and the Voice) for example, Kircher interlaces disquisitions into the production 
of sound with vivid illustrations of human and animal anatomies (f. 22).$# Therein, the 
polymath’s chapter headings range from explorations into the very origins of sound (e.g. 
Chapter II, “De Genesi sive productione soni”), to elaborate transcriptions of and 
reflections on a variety of bird calls, insect sounds, and even the croaking of frogs (Figure 
3.1, “De Vocibus volucrum,” f. 30; also “De Insectorum quorundam vocibus uti de Ranis, 
Cicadis, Locustis, Grillis”; “De causa coaxatus Ranarum,” p. 32). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
seventeenth century: “Despite its immense influence on musicians writing on musical style throughout 
much of the eighteenth century, Kircher’s classification cannot be considered systematic. The weakness in 
the scheme lies primarily in its attempt to classify and define styles according to such varied criteria as 
social function, musical genre, and compositional technique … affective quality constitutes a consistent 
criterion in Kircher’s discussion of individual styles, the concept of the affection emerging as the ‘one 
homogeneous means of classification.’” The Stylus Fantasticus and the Free Keyboard Music of the North 
German Baroque (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 18. 
 
29 Athanasius Kircher, Musurgia universalis (Rome: 1650), 22–32. 
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Figure 3.1, “De Vocibus volucrum” in Athanasius Kircher, Musurgia universalis, f. 30 
 
 
 
Such a broad swath of ideas so generously included in Kircher’s rambling text is likely to 
leave the modern reader in a state of confusion. What exactly can the Musurgia tell us 
about the affections, seventeenth-century taxonomy and, by extension, the episteme’s 
structures for knowledge?   
Like Descartes’ Compendium, Kircher’s treatise is a fraught synthesis of 
Renaissance constructions of resemblance and an exhaustive, Classical taxonomy. The 
enclosing of likenesses of sound—ranging from the highly theoretical to the whimsically 
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banal (i.e. croaking frogs)—into a singular volume evinces an epistemological shift, out 
of which the subjectivity of the early-modern listener is born alongside the emergence of 
Classical representation. As natural signs, then, these constellations of similarities lend 
themselves easily to categorization. Book VII of the Musurgia, in which the theorist 
adumbrates a variety of musical styli, is an exponent of this. As styli, musical genres 
could function as representation, having themselves “no content, no function, and no 
determination other than what [they] represent, entirely ordered upon and transparent to 
it.”30 The affective possibility of these styli, rooted in the same mimetic principles on 
which Plato expounded and Boethius disseminated, but now quantified as mathematical 
proportions, is therefore transformed from a direct response to a cognitive process that 
included the same mathesis within it. The phenomenology of musical expression in the 
seventeenth century begins to move away from the “domain of the physicist,” to 
paraphrase Descartes, and toward the realm of the composer, without ever being fully 
divested of a system of correspondences. 
Like Descartes’ Compendium, Kircher’s comprehensive Musurgia presents us 
with an epistemological quandary. The Jesuit’s stylus phantasticus, or fantastic style, is 
of particular interest, for in its implication of the musical subject as a generative (and 
cognitive) force, it calls into question the significance of a universal mathesis of music 
and its relationship to the composer in the Classical episteme. Kircher writes,  
The fantastic style is suitable for instruments. It is the most free and unrestrained 
method of composing; it is bound to nothing, neither to words nor to a melodic 
subject; it was instituted to display genius and to teach the hidden design of 
harmony and the ingenious composition of harmonic phrases and fugues; it is 
                                                
30 Foucault, The Order of Things, 64. 
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divided into those [pieces] that are commonly called fantasias, ricercatas, 
toccatas, sonatas.31 
 
Kircher’s definition of the stylus phantasticus is provocative for its introduction of the 
notion of the composer’s ingenium into seventeenth-century discourses on musical 
fantasy. As Friedhelm Krummacher, Paul Collins, and others have demonstrated, 
Kircher’s positioning of the fantasia as a stylus—and its applicability as a procedure 
across a wide range of genres—interfaces curiously with the artifice of strict counterpoint 
(i.e. fugues).32 As such, Kircher also intertwines the idea of ingenium, including an 
association with display and freedom, with elaborately complex and traditionally rigid 
polyphonic structures.  
The result is a paradox that positions the stylus phantasticus as a type of musical 
chicanery: a rational composition that would be “bound to nothing”—a Classical sign, or 
topos, representing a composer’s ingenium in whatever context that happened to be.33 
However, this interpretation does not account for what Kircher calls music’s “hidden 
design of harmony” (abdita ratio harmoniae). Kircher’s evocation of harmony’s hidden 
design is not simply to temper a composer’s ingenium with burgeoning rationality, as 
Collins would have us believe (for this, we will have to wait until the eighteenth century 
and the limits of representation), but to implicate and explicate it within the greater 
                                                
31 “Phantasticus stylus aptus instrumentis, est liberrima, et solutissima componendi methodus, nullis, nec 
verbis, nec subiecto harmonico adstrictus ad ostentandum ingenium, et abditam harmoniae rationem, 
ingeniosumque harmonicarum clausularum, fugarumque contextum docendum institutus, dividiturque in 
eas, quas Phantasias, Ricercatas, Toccatas, Sonatas vulgo vocant, Cuiusmodi compositione vide in libro V 
fol. 243 et 311 a nobis compista triphonia fol. 466, 480, 487, et libr. VI varijs instruentis accomodatas 
considera.” Kircher, Musurgia universalis, 585. English translation in Kerala Snyder, Dieterich Buxtehude: 
Organist in Lübeck (New York: Schirmer, 1987), 251–2. Quoted in Paul Collins, The Stylus Phantasticus, 
29. 
 
32 Ibid., 31. 
 
33 Ibid., 32. 
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workings of a seventeenth-century universe—as affect. In an earlier portion of Book VII, 
Kircher addresses the affections thus: 
Harmony, then, naturally affects man; but number and proportion (a movement of 
the air) affects the spirit (the organ of the motor faculty); words of fancy set up an 
object, which, if it is merry, will stir one to similar affects and emotions; if it is 
sad and gloomy, it will elicit tears, groans and sighs; if it breathes a martial rage, 
it will drive subjects of a martial disposition to a like rage, and so on.34 
 
It is only via the Affektenlehre that we are able to understand the stylus phantasticus as an 
exponent of representation; only in the surety of representation as epistemological sine 
qua non can Kircher (as an exemplar of seventeenth-century structures for knowledge) 
untroublingly synthesize musical proportion and human sensibility as such. In Foucault’s 
Classical episteme, the capacities for knowledge inhere in the materials themselves: the 
notion of compositional ingenium thus places the listening and feeling musical subject at 
the center of a universal mathesis of music that was always already decipherable in this 
model.  
 The stylus fantasticus of Athanasius Kircher, like the resultant mind-body dualism 
that obtains in Descartes’ Compendium musicae, therefore casts into relief a curious 
seventeenth-century musical subject that is both processing (evinced by Descartes’ 
rationalist stance in the Compendium and the later Discourse on Method) and a mere 
resonant space for a pre-ordained, mathematically cogent system of affect. Indeed, the 
physics of sympathetic vibration—the literal materiality of acoustics made visible and 
quantifiable at this time—yield structures of feeling in the seventeenth century that 
                                                
34 “Harmonia itaque naturaliter hominem afficit; numerous vero et proportion morus aeris, afficir spiritum 
motivae facultatis organum; verba phantasie sistunt obiectum, quod si iucundum suerit, in affectus 
motusque consimiles concitabit, si triste et luctuosum, lachrymas, gemitus et suspiria eliciet: si martium 
furorem spiret, ad eunde ingenij martii subiecta impellet, et sic de coeteris.” Kircher, Musurgia universalis, 
551. My thanks to Jonathan Breit for his translation. 
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themselves became susceptible to an increasingly taxonomic worldview.35 In this light, no 
investigation into the Affektenlehre discourse would be complete without a look at Johann 
Mattheson’s Der vollkommene Capellmeister (1739). For the purposes of this document, 
I choose to focus on a comparison between Kircher’s stylus fantasticus and Mattheson’s 
own summary of musical fantasy, and what this comparison can tell us about the 
eighteenth century’s understanding of knowledge and feeling in the Baroque. 
 Mattheson begins his definition of the fantastic style thus:  
The name fantasy is normally detested; though we do have a style of writing with 
this name which is a favorite and which maintains its place mainly with the 
orchestra and on the stage, not only for instruments but also for vocalists. It 
actually consists not so much in the writing or composing with the pen, as in the 
singing and playing that occurs spontaneously, or as is said extempore [sic.]. The 
Italians call this style a mente or non a penna. Though the so-called Fantasie, 
Capriccie, Toccate, Ricercare, etc., be they written down or printed really belong 
here, not to mention the boutades and the preludes.36 
 
The reader notes that Mattheson’s phantastischer Stil and Kircher’s stylus phantasticus 
are strikingly similar; indeed, the former based many portions of his Der vollkommene 
Capellmeister on the latter’s widely-circulated Musurgia. It is worthwhile to remark, 
however, that significant differences between the two treatises abound, chief among these 
                                                
35 For more on the influence of machinery and technology on the affections in the seventeenth century, see 
Penelope Gouk, “Clockwork or Musical Instrument? Some English Theories of Mind-Body Interaction 
Before and After Descartes,” and Thomas Christensen, “The Sound World of Father Mersenne,” in 
Structures of Feeling in Seventeenth-Century Cultural Expression, ed. Susan McClary (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2013). 
 
36 “Der phantastische Nahm ist sonst sehr verhaßt; alleine wir haben eine Schreib-Art dieses Nahmens, die 
wol beliebt ist, und hauptsächlich ihren Sitz im Orchester und auf der Schaubühne, nicht nur für 
Instrumente, sondern auch für Sing-Stimmen behauptet. Er bestehet eigentlich nicht sowol im Setzen oder 
Componiren mit der Feder, als in einem Singen und Spielen, das aus freiem Geiste, oder, wie man sagt, ex 
tempore geschiehet. Die Italiener nennen diesen Styl a mente, non a penna. Wiewol die so 
genannten: Fantasie, Capriccie, Toccate, Ricercate &c. sie mögen geschrieben oder gedruckt seyn, 
allerdings hieher gehören, der Boutaden und Vorspiele nicht zu vergessen.” Johann Mattheson, Der 
vollkommene Capellmeister (Hamburg: Christian Herold, 1739), Teil 1, Kap. 10, §88, trans. Ernest C. 
Harriss, Johann Mattheson’s Der vollkommene Capellmeister: A Revised Translation with Critical 
Commentary (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1973), 216. 
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the documents’ respective audiences. As Claude Palisca notes, Mattheson most certainly 
intended for his document to be used by the every day musician as a guide to 
composition, a practical applicability Kircher, writing in extensive Latin prose only 
eighty-nine years prior to Mattheson, would not have imagined for his own treatise.37 To 
position Mattheson as a mere pedagogue entirely divested of the traditions of Medieval 
and Renaissance musica speculativa, though, undermines his treatise’s pedigree and 
epistemology.  
A curious addition to Kircher’s stylus phantasticus presents in Mattheson’s 
description of the phantastischer Stil. Of the fantastic style, Mattheson writes, 
One is restricted in this style of writing only to the rules of harmony, to no others. 
Whoever can bring to bear the most artistic embellishments and the rarest 
inventions does the best. … The principal motifs and subjects cannot be 
completely ignored just because of the improvisatory nature; they may however 
not be done in sequence. Much less be regularly performed: hence those 
composers who work out formal fugues in their fantasias or toccatas do not 
maintain the integrity of this style, for nothing is so very contrary to it as order 
and constraint.38 
 
                                                
37 “In the volkommener Capellmeister Mattheson Germanizes Kircher’s categories, which in the book on 
melody were still couched in Kircher’s Latin. But every one of the categories themselves is retained … 
From the earlier terminological focus Mattheson now shifts toward compositional procedures. He is now 
writing for the musician, initiating him into unfamiliar styles in which he needs to become proficient as a 
listener, performer, and composer. … Throughout his chapter Mattheson strives to instill a sensitivity to 
stylistic propriety and decorum with verbal characterizations that are more evocative than scientific.” 
Claude V. Palisca, “The Genesis of Mattheson’s Style Classification,” in New Mattheson Studies, ed. 
George J. Buelow and Hans Joachim Marx (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 414. 
 
38 “An die Regeln der Harmonie bindet man sich allein bey dieser Schreib-Art, sonst an keine. Wer die 
meisten künstlichsten Schmückungen und selteneste Fälle anbringen kan, der fährt am besten. … Die 
Haupt-Sätze und Unterwürffe lassen sich zwar, eben der ungebundenen Eigenschafft halber, nicht gantz 
und gar ausschliessen; sie dürffen aber nicht recht an einander hangen, vielweniger ordentlich ausgeführet 
werden: daher denn diejenigen Verfasser, welche in ihren Fantaisien oder Toccaten förmliche Fugen 
durcharbeiten, keinen rechten Begriff von dem vorhabenden Styl hegen, als welchem kein Ding so sehr 
zuwieder ist, denn die Ordnung und der Zwang” in Johann Mattheson, Der vollkommene Capellmeister 
(Hamburg: Christian Herold, 1739), Teil 1, Kap. 10, §94, trans. Ernest C. Harriss, Johann Mattheson’s Der 
vollkommene Capellmeister, 216.  
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This stipulation—that strict, imitative counterpoint has no place in the fantasia or 
toccata—contrasts with Kircher’s own contention that compositional artifice is well 
suited to the style. Mattheson also directly acknowledges the “improvisatory nature” of 
the phantastischer Stil, a distinction from Kircher’s stylus phantasticus that Paul Collins 
reads as an introduction of the musical performer into matters of musical 
phenomenology.39  
This interpretation, like Palisca’s, overlooks essential matters of epistemology: for 
Kircher and his contemporaries, the hidden harmonic design of a fantasia or toccata acted 
as a microcosmographical function of the universe’s greater harmonic design. The delight 
of the fantasia thus stemmed from a composer’s deft synthesis of elaborate counterpoint 
and ingenium. Mattheson’s acknowledgment of Kircher’s investment in a metaphysics 
characterized by likenesses and his eschewing of it, however, is a further intensification 
of the musical-subject-focused universe initiated by Descartes in the Compendium and 
only hinted at in the Musurgia. In this sense, by configuring the phantastischer Stil as a 
Classical sign unto itself, divested of “hidden harmony” (the style’s plan would now be 
based on formulations of subjectivity like taste and sentiment), Mattheson doubles down 
on a ternary structure of musical understanding of affect rooted in Descartes’ mind-body 
dualism. This understanding would be predicated on a transmission of feeling that 
consisted of a literal impulse, an interpretation of this impulse as a physical phenomenon 
                                                
39 “Mattheson, eighty-nine years after Kircher’s Musurgia was published, would, interestingly, reproduce 
what he mistakenly believed to be the incipits of both a toccata and fantasia by Froberger to illustrate his 
own concept of the stylus phantasticus, which skewed the notion of the ‘fantastic’ to refer more to the 
improvising performer than the calculated final produces of the compositional process. The improvisatory 
‘freedom’ and extemporary ability that Mattheson was later to view as pivotal to the fantastic style was 
seemingly not of consequence to Kircher.” Collins, The Stylus Phantasticus, 31. 
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in the body, and a resultant “sympathetic vibration” in the soul, but more importantly, as 
a process mediated by the musical subject’s own apperception.40  
 With the vestiges of a seventeenth-century cognitive musical subject situated at 
the center of an increasingly perceived and theorized system of signs and representations, 
the taxonomy that presents in Mattheson’s Der vollkommene Capellmeister underscores 
the eighteenth century’s often enigmatic relationship to human sensibility. George 
Buelow’s summary of affections that Mattheson associated with specific musical keys in 
an earlier treatise, Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre from 1713 (Figure 3.2), evinces a 
somewhat uncompromising system of classification already inherent in the theorist’s 
reasoning.!" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
40 In contrast to my own, George Buelow’s model of Cartesian affect takes a somewhat anachronistic, 
hermeneutical stance: “Mattheson believed the listener was involved in a four-part aesthetic experience. 
First, he heard the music; second, apperception occurred when the listener interpreted the various musical 
symbols (hermeneutical interpretation) leading to a recognition of an Affection; third, the listener perceived 
the emotion; and fourth, through reelection on the experience, he would enjoy moral improvement and, 
when appropriate, a religious edification. Like Descartes and other contemporary philosophers, Mattheson 
thought the Affections existed either as virtues or as vices. Both types were capable of musical expression, 
but only through the virtuous Affections could the soul be healed.” George J. Buelow, “Johann Mattheson 
and the Invention of the Affektenlehre,” New Mattheson Studies, ed. Buelow and Marx, 401. 
 
41 Johann Mattheson, Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre (Hamburg: B. Schiller, 1713). 
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Figure 3.2, Keys and Corresponding Affections in Johann Mattheson, Das neu-eröffnete  
Orchestre (1713) 
 
 
 
 
This chart would seem to construe Mattheson as an exponent of a worldview steeped in 
signs and representations such that emotions could be theorized within the paradigm of 
Cartesian reasoning as causal relationships in the body. However, in Der vollkommene 
Capellmeister, Mattheson is mindful of his own subjectivity, offering the following as a 
clarification of how the affections could be understood (and, one might say, 
implemented) most effectively:  
Besides, the more one tries to postulate something positive about them, the more 
one finds contradictory things, because the beliefs about this material are almost 
numberless. For this I know no other reason than that based on the differences of 
human constitutions [Complexionen], according to which for someone with a 
sanguine temperament a key may seem lively and merry, but for someone who is 
phlegmatic, it will seem complaining and troubled, etc.42 
 
                                                
42 Johann Mattheson, Das neu-eröffnete Orchestre. Quoted in Buelow, “Mattheson and the Affektenlehre,” 
402. 
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The fact that Mattheson believed that certain keys elicited certain affections is not of 
primary importance here. Rather, as a list—or at the very least, as the potential for a 
list—Mattheson’s affections implicated an eighteenth-century musical subject that was 
both aware and unaware of its cognition. The Classical subject’s awareness manifested in 
Cartesian, physical relationships that were rooted in the laws of physics; its unawareness 
stemmed from a growing propensity to classification that would relegate anomalous 
phenomena (largely related to this same subjectivity) to a liminal space.    
 Johann Mattheson’s Der vollkommene Capellmeister and its antecedent, the 
Musurgia universalis of Athanasius Kircher, are exemplifications and intensifications of 
structures for knowledge made manifest in Descartes’ initiation of early-modern 
cognition. With the physical, impulse-driven mechanics of human sensibility rendered 
increasingly theoretical in Descartes’ model (itself a curious interface of inherited 
Renaissance metaphysics and early-modern rationalism), scholars in the Classical 
episteme readily traded in systems of representation. The seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century Affektenlehre (applied loosely here as a terminology) thus attempted a universal 
mathesis of musical phenomenology that hinged on the listening and feeling subject’s 
apperception of natural signs, and, curiously, its own subjectivity in relation to the 
universe’s greater design. The assessments of the fantastic style in the writings of Kircher 
and Mattheson show how this subjectivity—positioned by both theorists in relation to the 
concept of ingenium—evinces a propensity to taxonomy that operated in ontological 
contrast to the period’s structures for feeling. The following sections demonstrate how 
this early-modern contradiction came to bear on matters pertaining to fissures in these 
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taxonomic structures, namely as it related to the construction of gender, and the 
episteme’s acknowledgement of the limits of representation.   
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CHAPTER IV 
MUSIC MAKING BY WOMEN AND THE HEGEMONY OF NOTATION 
 
As indicated in the previous sections, the construction of a musical subject in the 
Baroque parallels a reconfiguration of early-modern musical semiotics, due in large part 
to the ubiquity of written music in the Renaissance. More specifically, the circulation of 
printed music throughout Europe inaugurated a new class of musical practitioners and 
consumers. As such, the standardization of musical notation, coupled with the availability 
of print matter, redefined the conceptualization of musical extemporaneity and aligned it 
with connotations of inexplicability and otherness. The alterity of improvisation thus 
attained a multivalence of signification in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
carrying with it characteristics of the fantastic topos, spectacle and virtuosity, and a link 
to notions of femininity.   
A full investigation into the vast and rich history of extemporaneous female music 
making—a synthesis of processes that are at once productive (women composers, 
performers, improvisers, patronesses, and antiquarians) and inductive (the subsequent 
influence these women had on musical practice and aesthetics, largely promulgated by 
men)—and this tradition’s overwhelming marginalization is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. This well-trodden musicological terrain is often relegated to the fringe of music-
theoretical scholarship, and has interfaced even less with the history of music theory. 
Susan McClary’s seminal Feminine Endings from 1991 and its notable situating of 
analysis as a gendered discourse brings to the fore a host of historically problematized 
issues pertaining to music theory and its traditionally uncompromising formalist stance 
 
 
 
28 
on music qua music.43 Similar positions have been argued by a cadre of authors with 
regard to other conspicuous omissions from the mostly unilaterally male and 
heteronormative historiography of music.44 Historically, music theory has in many ways 
been reluctant to engage with extra-musical sociopolitical issues in this manner, though 
not exclusively, and in curious ways, as Kofi Agawu notes, “new musicologists often fall 
back on conventional methods. … Rarely are the perceptual and conceptual foundations 
of musical analysis openly confronted.”45 My goal in presenting this already mired 
historiography as a regrettably unrefined summary, and, in turn, folding this history into 
the historiography of musical analysis, is not to analyze an unwieldy corpus of fantasias, 
ricercars, toccatas, and the like, but rather to consider the operative epistemology that 
engendered this music’s construction alongside its contemporaneous analytical toolkit. 
As early as 1500, Karin Pendle notes, female performers were featured delicacies 
at homosocial gatherings of male cognoscenti in Europe, as exponents of an already 
robust tradition of improvised vocal performances.46 By the early-seventeenth century, 
the notion of women as musicians came to be associated with the prominence of the 
                                                
43 Susan McClary, Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1991). 
 
44 Jane Bowers and Judith Tick, eds., Women Making Music: The Western Art Tradition, 1150-1950 
(London: Macmillan Press Music Division, 1986); Philip Brett, Elizabeth Wood, and Gary C. Thomas, 
eds., Queering the Pitch: The New Gay and Lesbian Musicology (New York: Routledge, 1994); Judith A. 
Peraino, Listening to the Sirens: Musical Technologies of Queer Identity from Homer to Hedwig (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006). 
 
45 V. Kofi Agawu, “Analyzing Music Under the New Musicological Regime,” The Journal of Musicology 
15:3 (Summer 1997): 302. 
 
46 “In mid-sixteenth-century Venice, wealthy and noble men took pleasure in meeting with their educated, 
like-minded peers in informal clubs, called academies. … One of the best known of these academies was 
that led by Domenico Venier. … Of particular importance here is the interest Venier and his circle took in 
improvised song as performed by accomplished female singers.” Karin Pendle, “Musical Women in Early 
Modern Europe,” in Women and Music: A History, ed. Karin Pendle (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2001), 69. 
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courtesan.47 The increasing influence of musica secreta in the late-sixteenth century, 
designated for the private enjoyment of men and women of the nobility, gave the female 
voice an illicit compositional characterization within this early-Baroque paradigm of 
extemporal performance. In the mid-sixteenth century, for instance, Alfonso II d’Este, the 
Duke of Ferrara, assembled his own all-female ensemble, the concerto delle donne, 
which specialized in “music decorated with numerous passaggi, trills, and cadenzas, 
probably improvised in rehearsal and then committed to memory.”48 In the 1570s and 
80s, Anthony Newcomb writes, the Duke lured a fair amount of talented female 
musicians to his court, whose music making he reserved for only the most intimate 
occasions. In an almost peculiar transformation, however, the reservata nature of 
Alfonso’s consort became integral to carnival spectacles in the early 1580s with one 
observer reflecting on the celebrations thus: “‘this evening the main street was adorned 
by an infinite number of horses and carriages; among them was a large uncovered 
carriage filled with nymphs singing sweet amorous trifles.’”!# With the ensemble’s 
display as such, the formerly private music making of Alfonso’s highly skilled musicians 
became fetishized, along with its gestures of extemporaneity. 
Despite the improvisatory heritage of these delightful musical “trifles,” Alfonso’s 
concerto—along with its agile vocal acrobatics and diminutions—was influenced by and, 
in turn, influenced notation and print culture. The secret pastime and occasional carnival 
display of the Duke eventually blossomed into a locus of Italian commerce, with Tasso, 
                                                
47 Pendle, “Musical Women in Early Modern Europe,” 77. 
 
48 Ibid., 82. 
 
49 Anthony Newcomb, The Madrigal at Ferrara, 1579–1597 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
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Luzzaschi, and other madrigalists writing and publishing for the women and the 
developing musical market.%& Similarly, Newcomb highlights the singing a libro by the 
concerto delle donne, from part-books at sight, as indicative of a remarkable performance 
practice that was unique for female performers, and one that invites a reconsideration of 
the concerto’s influence. “It was distinctly unusual,” he writes, “ to find that such ladies 
had benefited by considerable musical training, and that they used their training and skill 
for the performance in concert of printed polyphonic music … a great deal of music for 
the musica secreta must have been brought in from the outside.”%"  
Herein, we observe the shaping of an all-female singing tradition by memorized 
gestures of virtuosity and spontaneity, packaged as formulae and delivered, presumably, 
in moments of pathos or intense pleasurability.52 More significantly, this influence 
exceeded the largely domestic boundaries of the Ferrara court, occasioning a reification 
of the madrigal style and matters of commerce. The fervor for all-female singing at this 
time was pervasive enough to infiltrate ecclesiastical matters, such that one observer 
described the captivating musical nuns at Ferrara’s San Vito as “‘not human, bodily 
creatures, but rather truly angelic spirits.’”53 Within secular, commercial, and religious 
contexts, therefore, the changing concept of all-female music making begins to connote 
                                                
50 Newcomb, The Madrigal at Ferrara, 69. 
 
51 Ibid., 68. 
 
52 “In contrast with the polyphonic madrigal, which was deigned as chamber music largely for the pleasure 
of participants, the music written for the Ladies of Ferrara means to be consumed as display.” See Susan 
McClary, Desire and Pleasure in Seventeenth-Century Music (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2012), 84. 
 
53 Pendle, “Musical Women in Early Modern Europe,” 70. 
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“otherworldliness,” if not simply a generalized alterity wherein women represent a 
supposed conduit between the corporeal and metaphysical, unmediated by notation. 
Similarly, by 1600, the evolving relationship between performance and notation 
became bound up in a reconsideration of what exactly constituted a musical composition, 
and increasingly nebulous exchanges between sacred and secular realms. The preface to 
Lodovico Viadana’s Cento concerti ecclesiastici (1602) proudly heralds the dawn of a 
new, more practically-minded era—the seconda pratica, after Monteverdi—and positions 
the collection of concerted music that follows as an inevitable (though still ingenious, 
certainly by his own estimation) solution to long-standing problems of chorus personnel 
and ability: basso continuo.54 Mindful of his singers, Viadana is careful not to impinge on 
their naturally improvisatory sensibilities in these contexts, though nevertheless resorts to 
notating previously extemporized gestures (passaggi comuni) and offering them up as 
tasteful suggestions.55 In conjunction with the increasingly institutionalized 
implementation of basso continuo in sacred contexts and the subsequent proliferation of 
the madrigale concerto, documents like Viadana’s underscore John Walter Hill’s 
contention that “the church concerto of the early seventeenth century arises, in part, out 
of a process of reducing to precise notation aspects of actual performance that were 
                                                
54 Lodovico Viadana, Li cento concerti ecclesiastici (Venice, 1602).  
 
55 “Non ho mancato di apportare à tempo, & à loco alcuni passi, e cadenze con altri lochi accommodati per 
Accentuare, per Passeggiare, e per fare altre prove della dispositione, e gratia dei Cantori, se bene per il più, 
e per facilità, si è usato Passaggi comuni, che la natura istessa porta, ma più fioriti.” “I have not failed to 
introduce, where appropriate, certain figures and cadences, and other convenient opportunities for 
ornaments and passagework and for giving other proofs of the aptitutde and elegant style of the singers, 
although, for the most part, to facilitate matters, the stock passaggi have been used, such as nature itself 
provides, but more florid.” Lodovico Viadana, “Preface to One Hundred Sacred Concertos, op. 12 (1602)” 
in Oliver Strunk and others, Source Readings in Music History (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), 619.  
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formerly not reflected in the written music.”56 The preface to Giulio Caccini’s Le nuove 
musiche (1601) perhaps most overtly embodies this notion, codifying a broad swath of 
ornamental vocal gestures followed by twenty-three works in which these notated figures 
are prominently highlighted.57 The introductory measures of the composer’s solo 
madrigal “Movetevi a pietà” is but one example of this increasingly hegemonic approach 
to musical notation. 
 
Figure 4.1, Giulio Caccini, “Movetevi a pietà,” in Le nuove musiche (1601), mm. 1–11 
 
 
 
 
                                                
56 John Walter Hill, Baroque Music: Music in Western Europe, 1580-1750 (New York: W.W. Norton, 
2005), 96. 
 
57 Giulio Caccini, Le nuove musiche (Firenze: Marescotti, 1601). 
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Caccini’s Le nuove musiche and a host of other seventeenth-century concerted 
madrigals bespeak a shift in compositional approach: performances could and should be 
flexible, evinced by the inherently improvisatory nature of basso continuo, but were 
increasingly delimited by notational constraints. Furthermore, the emergence of the 
seconda pratica signaled a generalized fluidity between secular and sacred musical 
realms, engendering a fraught and increasingly unclear stance on heavily ornamented 
performances by female singers. Amidst this early-modern reconfiguration of 
extemporaneity, the conceptualization of music making was transformed into an almost 
fully notation-centric enterprise. Women were not, though, consigned to a life of 
extemporal music creation simply because many lacked the means to notate or read the 
compositions of the day, as the concerto delle donne and what we know of performance 
practice would attest. More likely, the increasing hegemony of graphic symbolism 
pushed musical improvisation—and with it gestures of musical ex tempore like 
diminution, trills, and cadenzas—to the boundaries of musical meaning.  
This semiotic “edge” on which the fraught concepts of femininity and virtuosity 
intertwined during the Baroque is most discernible in opera. Recent scholars have pointed 
to the operatic stage as the physical and metaphorical space on and from which music’s 
expressiveness underwent a sort of gendering. “Those performances [by women],” 
Carolyn Abbate writes, “had a significant effect: shaping an impulse to weave between 
opera and performance, between listener, author, and noisemaker, to return to 
performance as a phenomenon, to contemplate the possibility of a ‘double work.’”%' I 
extrapolate Abbate’s analysis to include the “double work” of women in opera as the 
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living, fleshly performance of inanimate notes on a page written by men. This reading 
invites an ontological reconfiguration of musical practices like ornamentation and 
virtuosic display: “the text,” Abbate continues, “the authority of the male composer, and 
the strangleholds of objectification and representation, are ultimate objects of celebration, 
and in a peculiar sense the music—the realization of that text, and those responsible for 
it—has begun to vanish.”%# Concurrent with opera, instrumental musical material 
generated in an extemporal aura—that marked by performative “excess,” to borrow 
Susan McClary’s terminology—is thus positioned in contrast and resistance to notation’s 
hegemony. We might say that musical notation became doubly fetishized in the 
seventeenth century, with the curiosity of female performance developed as a 
representational sign alongside the objectification of music’s symbology.         
Again, Kircher’s Musurgia universalis serves as a useful excursion into these 
matters of early-modern signification. The practice of including musical excerpts in 
theoretical documents was certainly not new in 1650; the tradition dates back to at least 
the ninth century Musica enchiriadis treatise and likely earlier. However, the 
incorporation of Johann Froberger’s Fantasia supra Ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la (FbWV 201), 
which the theorist refers to as a paragon of the stylus fantasticus (under the rubric of “De 
Symphonia Clavicymbalo Apta”), is unique, however, for its complete presentation and 
for Kircher’s commentary (Figure 4.2). Kircher writes,  
Harpsichords, organs, regals and all multiplucked musical instruments … require 
compositions, which indeed must be such, that with them the organist not only 
shows his own genius, but also with them as preambles as it were he prepares and 
excites the spirits of the listeners for the entertainment of the symphonic harmony 
that will follow. Many call harmonic compositions of this type praeludia, Italian 
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toccatas, sonatas, ricercatas, of which manner we present one, which J. Jacob 
Froberger, imperial organist and formerly pupil of the most celebrated organist 
Hieronymus Frescobaldi made on ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la, prepared with such 
workmanship that whether you observe the most perfect method of composition 
and of fugues, the order of things following themselves cleverly, or the 
remarkable change of the time, it seems that nothing at all can be missing; and 
therefore we consider it to be set out before all organists as a most perfect 
example of composition of this kind which they might imitate.(& 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
60 Kircher, Musurgia universalis, 465. Translation in Snyder, Dietrich Buxtehude: Organist in Lübeck, 255. 
“Clavicymbala, Organa, Regalia & omnia polyplectra instrumenta musica … compositiones requirunt, quae 
quidem tales debent esse, ut ijs organoedus non tantus ingenium suum ostendat sed & ijs veluti praeambulis 
quibusdam auditorium animos praeparet, excitq; ad symphoniaci concentus sequuturi apparatum; Vocant 
plerique huiusmode harmonicas compositions praeludia, Itali Toccatas, Sonatas, Ricercatas cuiusmodi hic 
unam exhibemus, quam D. Io. Iacobus Frobergerus Organedus Caesareus celeberrimi olim Organedi 
Hieronymi Frescobaldi discipulus, supora Ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la exhibuet eo artificio adornatam, Ut sive 
perfectissimam compsitionis methodum, fugartumq; ingeniose se sectantium ordeineml sive insignem 
temporis mutationem varietatemque sepctes, nihil prorsus desiderari posse videatur: adeoque illam omnibus 
Organoedis, tanquam perfectissimum in hoc genere compositionis specimen quod imitentur, propenendum 
duximus.” 
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Figure 4.2, Johann Froberger, Fantasia supra Ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la, FbWV 201  
(ca. 1649), mm. 1–13 
 
 
As Paul Collins observes, Kircher’s use of Froberger’s Fantasia as a musical example in 
this context is less about its discussion of a composer’s ingenium and more about its 
visual presentation. “Kircher’s concept of the fantastical style,” Collins writes, “in 
accordance with the derivation of the Latin adjective phantasticus from the Greek !"#$% 
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 (phainein, ‘to show’) and !"$&'(% (phantazein, ‘make visible’), emphasizes the 
satisfaction of the intellect by means of a work’s visual order.”(" I would add, however, 
that along with visual order and intellect, we may observe in Kircher’s evocation of 
Froberger a nascent fetishizing of the fantastic topos, and an attempted normalization of 
it. Notated handsomely in open score, Kircher’s example is intended to invite inspection 
and realization of the Fantasia’s perfect, rational nature (tanquam perfectissimum). Like 
Alfonso’s concerto delle donne, the piece is legible to Kircher’s reader only as a musical 
object, and not as an aural experience. Abbate’s “double work” concept of opera, 
therefore, expands to interface with the history of music theory, and invites a gendered 
interpretation of the instrumental fantastic topos as representation. 
The vestiges of the association of women with unnotated music linger in 
eighteenth-century discourses on performance, talent, and taste. Book V of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau’s Émile (1762), in which the author addresses the education of Émile’s fiancée, 
Sophie, has embedded within it links between feminine sentiment and musical intuition. 
Rousseau writes, 
Sophie has natural talents; she senses them and she doesn’t ignore them: but not 
being exposed to much art or culture, she is content to exercise her pretty voice to 
sing appropriately and with taste, to walk lightly with little feet, easily, gracefully, 
to curtsey in all sorts of situations without discomfort or awkwardness. Besides, 
her only voice teacher was her father, her mother her only dance instructor, and a 
neighboring organist to give her some lessons in accompaniment she has since 
cultivated on her own. At first, she thought only to use her hand on the black 
keys, next she found that the harsh, dry sound of the harpsichord made her voice 
sound sweeter; little by little, she became sensitive to harmony; finally, maturing, 
she begin to feel the charms of expression and to love music for itself. But this is 
taste more than talent; she would hardly know how to sight read a tune.($  
                                                
61 Collins, The Stylus Phantasticus, 32. 
 
62 “Sophie a des talents naturels; elle les sent, & ne les a pas négligés: mais n’ayant pas été à portée de 
mettre beaucoup d’art à leur culture, elle s’est contentée d’exercer sa jolie voix à chanter juste & avec goût, 
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Here, Rousseau touches upon two important facets of eighteenth-century notational 
hegemony. First, the philosophe is eager to emphasize Sophie’s innate sensitivity, 
underscored by the his references to her taste, or “goût.” As such, Rousseau furthers the 
Enlightenment’s conception of female music making as biological and performative, 
noting that Sophie plays on the black keys of the harpsichord mainly by feel, and that 
Sophie cannot read music. The multivalence of the word “touche,” meaning “key” or 
“touch,” concords with Rousseau’s persistent reduction of Sophie to her representative 
body parts throughout Émile—diminutive feet and hands, for example. Similarly, 
Sophie’s voice is rendered sweeter only in contrast to the harpsichord’s brittle sound, 
ostensibly emphasizing her lack of training, but also a kind of suppleness brought into 
relief by the keyboard’s harsher, angular qualities.  
 Second, Rousseau intertwines the notions of music’s “charms” and Sophie’s 
performativity (“les charmes de l’expression”). “Charmes,” like “touche,” has a similar 
double meaning in this context: Sophie’s promising understanding of harmonic function 
is both an outgrowth of her natural sensitivity (without proper training, Rousseau is quick 
to remind us, Sophie has intuited most of her musical education) and recognition of how 
these musical maneuvers might produce emotional responses in her listeners. This residue 
of seventeenth-century affect-based structures of feeling is layered with yet another 
                                                                                                                                            
ses petits pieds à marcher légèrement, facilement, avec grâce, à faire la révérence en toutes sortes de 
situations sans gêne & sans maladresse. Du reste, elle n’a eu de maître à chanter que son père, de maîtresse 
à danser que sa mère; & un organiste du voisinage lui a donné sur le clavecin quelques leçons 
d’accompagnement qu’elle a depuis cultivé seule. D’abord elle ne songeoit qu’à reparaître sa main avec 
avantage sur ces touches noires, ensuite elle trouva que le son aigre & sec du clavecin rendait plus doux le 
son de la voix; peu à peu elle devint sensible à l’harmonie; enfin, en grandissant, elle à commencé de sentir 
les charmes de l’expression, & d’aimer la musique pour elle-même. Mais c’est un goût plutôt qu’un talent; 
elle ne sait point déchiffrer un air sur la note.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Émile ou de l’Éducation (Paris, 
1762), 274.  
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double-entendre, Sophie’s learning to feel and love music “pour elle-même,” either “for 
herself” or “for itself.” 
 The concept of music for itself, it may be argued, connotes transience and 
frivolity, and stems from the same “singerly” compositional procedures that inspired the 
res facta discourse mentioned earlier in this thesis, in addition to the performance 
practices of the concerto delle donne. In the seventeenth century, the curiosity of non-
mimetic instrumental music came to bear on constructions of musical subjectivity in the 
Affektenlehre, and carried with it associations with egregious vocal ornamentation and 
female performativity. For Rousseau and his contemporaries, then, Sophie’s love of 
music for her/itself was a doubly provocative peculiarity: female sentimentality and 
intuition compounded by the lack of notation. In an earlier portion of Émile, the author 
writes, 
It can well be believed that as I am in so little hurry to teach him to read writing, I 
will not be in a hurry to teach him to read music either. Let us set aside an effort 
of attention too great for his brain and not rush to fix his mind on conventional 
signs. This, I admit, seems to involve a difficulty, for although the knowledge of 
notes does not at first appear more necessary for knowing how to sing than does 
knowledge of letters for knowing how to speak, there is, however, this difference: 
in speaking we transmit our own ideas, while in singing we transmit hardly 
anything but others’ ideas. Now to transmit them, one must read them.() 
 
Musical meaning, in Rousseau’s interpretation, is inextricably linked to notational 
practice; his conceptualization therefore intensifies the taxonomic trajectory initiated in 
seventeenth-century composition treatises. Later in the same passage, the philosophe is 
                                                
63 On pense bien qu’étant si peu pressé de lui apprendre à lire l’écriture, je ne le serai as non plus de lui 
apprendre à lire la musique, écartons de son cerveau toute attention trop pénible, & ne nous hâtons point de 
fixer son esprit sur des signes de convention. Ceci, je l’avoue, semble avoir sa difficulté ; car, si la 
connaissance des notes ne paraît pas d’abord plus nécessaire pour savoir chanter que celle des lettres pour 
savoir parler, il y a pourtant cette différence, qu’en parlant nous rendons nos propres idées, & qu’en 
chantant nous ne rendons guère que celles d’autrui. Or, pour les rendre, il faut les lire.” Rousseau, Émile or 
On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 149.  
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keen to emphasize that true music making, in fact, necessitates notation, and that the 
process itself should be devoid of impulse or sentiment. “In order to know music well,” 
he writes, “it does not suffice to transmit it; it is necessary to compose it … never a 
bizarre song, never a passionate one, and never an expressive one.”(! Sophie’s charming 
expressiveness might then also be considered a reification of the female sign—a 
construction of sentimentality that Matthew Head associates with the period’s consumer 
culture and, poignantly, with the accessibility of printed music during the 
Enlightenment.(%            
While the free musical fantasia came to be codified as a musical topos via the 
seventeenth-century proliferation of the Affektenlehre, a conflation of the cultural concept 
of musical extemporaneity with the curiosity of unnotated music occurred 
simultaneously. This nexus of musical signifiers has at its origin the association of all-
female musical performance with religious hysteria, musica secreta, and ultimately a 
collective memory of opera and indelicate courtly entertainment. By the late-eighteenth 
century and the publication of Rousseau’s Émile, the Enlightenment’s hegemonic stance 
on musical notation assumes a fetishistic patina, with the musical score acting as a 
normalization of the “irregularity” of musical performance, itself a fetishized enterprise. 
In the following survey of eighteenth-century music theory documents, I explore further 
                                                
64 “De plus, pour bien savoir la musique, il ne suffit pas de la rendre, il la faut composer, & l’un doit 
s’apprendre avec l’autre, sans quoi l’on ne la sait jamais bien. Exercez votre petit musicien d’abord à faire 
des phrases bien régulières, bien cadencées ; ensuite à les lier entre elles par une modulation très simple, 
enfin à marquer leurs différens rapports par une ponctuation correcte ; ce qui se fait par le bon choix des 
cadences & des repos. Surtout jamais de chant bizarre, jamais de pathétique ni d’expression.” Rousseau, 
Émile, trans. Allan Bloom, 149. 
 
65 Matthew W. Head, Sovereign Feminine: Music and Gender in Eighteenth-Century Germany (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2013), 73. 
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the period’s struggle with the fantastic topos, specifically as it pertained to notation, 
taxonomy, and the reconceptualization of “womanly sentiment.”  
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CHAPTER V 
WAS IST AUFKLÄRUNG? SONATA QUE ME VEUX-TU? 
A SURVEY OF TAXONOMY AND MUSIC CRITICISM 
 
The question “Was ist Aufklärung?” posed in 1783 by Johann Friedrich Zöllner in 
Die Berlinische Monatsschrift engendered an outpouring of rejoinders from Germany’s 
thinkers including Immanuel Kant.66 Kant’s essay, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist 
Aufklärung?” opens famously with an Enlightenment “call to arms”:  
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the 
inability to use one’s own understanding without another’s guidance. This nonage 
is self-imposed if its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in indecision and 
lack of courage to use one’s own mind without another’s guidance. Dare to 
know! (Sapere aude.) “Have the courage to use your own understanding,” is 
therefore the motto of the Enlightenment.67 
 
By historiographical and archeological accounts, the Enlightenment as the 
standard-bearing epoch of modernity was well underway by the 1784 publication of 
Kant’s essay. A Whig classification like this—its application revisionist even at the time 
of Kant’s writing and certainly as a temporal category in this context—can therefore only 
be made tenuously. As such, the “enlightened” philosophical self-conception and 
reflexivity of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century scholars has been assiduously examined 
in an outpouring of scholarship. Foucault, whose own response to “Was ist 
                                                
66 Johann Friedrich Zöllner, “Was ist Aufklärung?” Berlinische Monatsschrift (December 1783). 
 
67 “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten 
Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu 
bedienen. Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel des 
Verstandes, sondern der Entschließung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines andern zu 
bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen! ist also der Wahlspruch 
der Aufklärung.” Immanuel Kant, “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” Berlinische 
Monatsschrift (December 1784): 481. trans. Mary C. Smith, “What Is Enlightenment? Immanuel Kant,”  
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html.  
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Aufklärung?”68 engages in a kind of tête-à-tête with Kant, and more contemporary 
theorists, including James Webster and Catherine Labio, have questioned the relevance of 
the term “Enlightenment” as applied to a specific age or duration of time.69 Despite these 
multivalent interpretations of the Enlightenment as epoch, philosophy, or even myth,70 it 
is nevertheless useful to understand that with supposed enlightened progressiveness came 
an epistemological proclivity for classification. The period saw a proliferation of 
encyclopedias, dictionaries, and musical treatises, many of which called into question the 
importance of musical notation as it pertained to a composer’s ingenium. As such, we 
might say that eighteenth-century musicians and theorists across Europe puzzled over the 
reconciliation of the concept of an unencumbered imagination within the representational 
episteme. 
As an unintended echo of the eighteenth century’s propensity to classification, I 
generate a taxonomy of taxonomies in this section. Tracing the definition of “fantasia” in 
a variety of dictionaries and related music theory documents, I highlight the free musical 
fantasia’s transformation under the influence of discourses on aesthetics. The widely 
circulated (and often quoted) dictionary of Sébastien de Brossard (1703) and 
Encyclopédie of Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1756–1768), considered 
here along with Jean-Philippe Rameau’s corrections to Rousseau’s musical definitions 
                                                
68 Michel Foucault, “Qu’est-ce que les Lumières?” The Foucault Reader (New York, Pantheon Books, 
1984), 32–50.  
 
69 James Webster, “Between Enlightenment and Romanticism in Music History: ‘First Viennese 
Modernism’ and the Delayed Nineteenth Century,” Nineteenth Century Music 25:2-3 (Spring 2001–02), 
108-126; Catherine Labio, Origins and the Enlightenment: Aesthetic Epistemology from Descartes to Kant 
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70 T.W. Adorno with Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford: 
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(Erreurs sur la Musique dans l’encyclopédie, 1755), form a triptych that elucidates 
aspects of French theories of the affections, which hinged in many ways on early-modern 
structures of mimesis and Cartesian metaphysics. Next, I consider musical fantasy in 
German music theory treatises from the latter half of the eighteenth century. Johann 
Georg Sulzer’s Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste (1771–74) exemplifies a reified 
philosophical outlook on musical imagination and creativity. The emergent empfindsamer 
Stil of the 1770s and 80s—and its chief exponent, C.P.E. Bach, whose own Versuch über 
die wahre Art as Clavier zu spielen (1753; 1762) I consider alongside A.F.C. Kollmann’s 
Essay on Musical Harmony (1796) in a final portion of this section—evinces a 
reassessment of the free musical fantasia. Whereas the fantastic topos presents as 
representation in the Baroque, a strained synthesis of improvised ingenuity and notation, 
creativity in the late-eighteenth century exceeded the bounds of the Classical sign. Music, 
acknowledged as non-representational, was thus easily assimilated into matters of 
epistemological curiosity from the previous century, including sensibility and gender. 
In 1703, Brossard defined the term “fantasia” as “a species of composition that is 
the pure effect of genius without the composer subjecting himself to a fixed number or 
particular quality of meter.”71 Brossard’s usage of the word “pure (pur)” in the context of 
“genius (génie)” signifies an implied ontological and linguistic connection between the 
free fantasia and unmediated nature. Likewise, the verb “to subject (assujettir)” employed 
reflexively, connotes a sense of freedom from subjection, as if the insertion of a bar line 
(“mesure”) into the context of a musical fantasia would be a truly tyrannical gesture. 
                                                
71 “Une espèce de Composition, qui est le pur effet du génie sans que le Compositeur s’assujettisse à un 
nombre fixe, ou à une certaine qualité de mesure.” Sébastien de Brossard, “Fantasia,” Dictionnaire de 
musique (Paris, 1703). 
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Like that of Brossard, Rousseau’s definition for “fantaisie” in the 1751 
publication of the Encyclopédie similarly positions the free musical fantasia as an 
extemporaneous outgrowth of inspiration.72 And like Brossard, Rousseau also inquires 
after the representational signification of notated fantasy, evinced by the philosophe’s 
effort to distinguish the fantasia from the capriccio. “There is this difference of the 
Capriccio from the Fantasia,” he writes,  
that the Capriccio is a gathering of unique and disparate ideas that resemble 
together a heated imagination, while the Fantasia can be a very regular piece, 
different from others in that one invents it as one executes it … It follows as such 
that a Capriccio might very well be written down, but never a Fantasia.73 
 
Curiously, via Rousseau’s interpretation, it is the capriccio as defined by the 
Encyclopédie rather than the free musical fantasia that is the genre characterized by “une 
imagination échauffée.” I draw a connection between this naturalized biological analogy 
(literally a “heated” or “warmed” imagination) and that of Brossard’s “pur effet du 
génie”; the notion of musical fantasy for Rousseau, then, is already rendered at least 
partly predictable (“régulière” meaning both habitual and “even,” perhaps as a reference 
to the regularity of the style brisé of many hackneyed, “improvised” preludes of 
Rousseau’s time) rather than as the sole musical exponent of an unchecked imagination. 
Rousseau instead hinges the very existence of the free musical fantasia as a style on its 
                                                
72 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Fantaisie,” Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des 
métiers, 6:403 (Paris, 1751).  
 
73 “Il y a cette différence du Caprice à la Fantaisie que le Caprice est un receuil d’idées singulières et 
disparates que rassemble une imagination échauffée, au lieu que la Fantaisie peut être une Pièce très 
régulière, qui ne diffère des autres qu’en ce qu’on l’invente en l’exécutant. … Il fuit de-là qu’un Caprice 
peut fort bien s’écrire, mais jamais une Fantaisie.” Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Fantaisie,” Dictionnaire de 
musique (Paris, 1768). 
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notation, insisting that—whether “régulière” or adventurous—a true fantasia could never 
be a written piece. 
The dialectic of opposed signifiers (that is to say of “génie” and notation) in these 
documents manifests peculiarly in the written representation of several keyboard works 
of the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. Indeed, a cursory examination of Louis 
Couperin’s A-minor Prélude non mesuré à l’imitation de M. Froberger (ca. 1685, Bauyn 
MS; Paris, Bibl. Nat.) compared with the notated examples found in François Couperin’s 
L’Art de toucher le clavecin from 1716 reveal much about the evolving conceptualization 
of the prelude at the dawn of the French Enlightenment.74 
 
Figure 5.1, Louis Couperin, Prélude non mesuré à l’imitation de M. Froberger (ca. 1685) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
74 Louis Couperin, Pieces de Clavecin...d'après le manuscrit Bauyn, rev. Thurston Dart (Monaco: L'Oiseau-
Lyre, 1959). François Couperin, L’Art de toucher le clavecin (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 
1716). 
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Figure 5.2, François Couperin, Premier Prélude from L’Art de toucher le clavecin  
(1716), mm. 1–11 
 
 
 
 
 
 The obvious discontinuities between these ostensibly “free” keyboard works are 
easily itemized: Louis Couperin’s Prélude is devoid of a prescribed meter or any 
conventional indication of note duration (the Prélude is written entirely in whole-notes). 
By contrast, François Couperin’s own C-major Prélude from L’Art de toucher le clavecin 
is notated in a strict duple meter, and features a prominent hierarchical division between 
the left and right hands, with the former characterized by a fairly simple two-voice 
counterpoint and the latter outlining an ornamental, though rhythmically precise melodic 
texture. The “soprano” voice of the Prélude might even be analyzed as a diminution of 
the slower moving “tenor” line, which is notated in tied half-notes. The performative 
aspects of Louis’s unmeasured prelude can only be conjectured, however Davitt Moroney 
insists that the phenomenon of musical ex tempore connoted by the composer’s “loose” 
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notation is exclusively visual rather than aural. “It is thus apparent,” he writes, “that 
many notationally unmeasured preludes can be affiliated to notationally measured genres. 
The notational dress disguises this musical fact, but the difference is for the player’s eye 
not the listener’s ear.”75  
It is indeed the “dress” of these two preludes, though, that is of significance to the 
eighteenth-century conceptualization of musical fantasy; the ultimate performance of 
these representative works may have, in fact, been strikingly similar, as Rousseau 
reminds us and Moroney underscores. The semiotics of indeterminacy embodied by 
Louis Couperin’s quintessentially seventeenth-century logography and its intended 
wholesale correspondence between sign and signified, however, is a gesture that may be 
situated well within the tenets of Cartesian metaphysics. As a visual phenomenon, then, 
the A-minor Prélude encapsulates the notion of extemporaneity as affect. This one-to-one 
correspondence disintegrates with François Couperin’s L’Art de toucher le clavecin, in 
which the composer offers the following paraphrase of Brossard in conjunction with his 
own preludes, and in turn explicates his systematization of improvisatory maneuvers: 
A prelude is a free composition, where the imagination gives itself over to 
anything and everything that presents. But, as it is quite rare to find geniuses 
capable of producing in the moment, it is necessary that those who avail 
themselves of these ruled preludes play them in an easy manner, not too focused 
on the precision of movement, unless I have expressly indicated the word 
measured. Thus, one might hazard to say that as in many things, music (compared 
to poetry) has its prose and its verse.76  
                                                
75 Davitt Moroney, “The Performance of Unmeasured Harpsichord Preludes,” Early Music 4:2 (April 
1976): 147. 
 
76 “[Une] prélude est une composition libre, où l’imagination se livre à tout ce qui se présente à elle. Mais, 
comme il est assez rare de trouver des génies capables de produire dans l’instant, il faut que ceux qui auront 
recourt à ces préludes réglés les jouent d’une manière aisée trop s’attacher à la précision des mouvements, à 
moins que je ne l’aie marqué exprès par le mot de mesuré [italics original]. Ainsi, on peut hazarder de dire 
que dans beaucoup de choses, la musique (par comparaison à la poésie) a sa prose, et ses vers.” Couperin, 
L’Art de toucher le clavecin, 1716. 
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The publication and dissemination of François Couperin’s treatise evinces a growing 
epistemological propensity to supplant previously agreeable notational vagaries within 
representative taxonomic constraints. Considered alongside his catalogue of agréments, 
the above quotation illustrates an era of inchoate “rationality”: the composer acquiesces 
to a long tradition of musical invention whereby the imagination “se livre,” or would give 
itself over to whatever whim or fancy it chose, but curiously excises individual will from 
the phenomenon of preluding, and provides rules (“préludes réglés”) for merely 
approximating this style in a more determined and accessible fashion. The result 
conscribes to characteristics of the free musical fantasia topos—a representation of 
compositional and performative ingenuity perplexingly contained within notations’ 
immutable signs and maneuvers.    
 Matters of musical imagination and its representation, like that demonstrated in 
the keyboard works of Louis and François Couperin, were of the utmost importance to 
Enlightenment philosophes like Brossard, Diderot, and Rousseau. Indeed, with the 
prominence of the Académie Royale des Sciences at this time (it was founded in 1666), 
as well as music’s long-standing association with mathematics (dating back to the 
Ancient quadrivium), French academics contributed heartily to discourses on harmony, 
acoustics, and tuning throughout the eighteenth century. As such, considerations of 
musical ingenuity and fantasia—modulation to distantly related key areas and striking 
experimentation with enharmonicity and chromaticism, for example—were tantalizingly 
open to debate by many high-minded Parisian thinkers, desperate to theorize a single 
governing principle for music’s phenomenology. At the root of this agitated attention to 
music and its relationship to the science of the age was Newton’s Opticks (1703), which 
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Thomas Christensen highlights as signaling a paradigm shift in natural philosophy.** 
Voltaire’s Élémens de la philosophie de Newton, published in 1738, cultivated an 
empiricist outlook in eighteenth-century France (and elsewhere), while an ethos of 
scientific experimentation and calculus came to be favored over the deductive rationalism 
of Descartes.*'  
Jean-Philippe Rameau, whose eighteenth-century sobriquet, the “Newton of 
Music,” reads today as an ironic misapprehension, is an illuminating point of reflection in 
my brief excursion on French Cartesianism. Jairo Moreno has demonstrated that 
Rameau’s Traité de l’harmonie from 1722 is in many ways an extension of Descartes’ 
Compendium: the cognition that characterized the seventeenth-century musical subject 
comes to bear directly on issues that concerned practicing musicians in Rameau’s day. In 
many ways then, the composer’s writings on accompaniment in the Traité, although not 
explicitly related to the fantastic topos but certainly connected to similar philosophical 
concepts, operate in opposition to the empiricist milieu of eighteenth-century French 
academia. Harmonic sequences, for example, coupled with Rameau’s instantiation of 
rules for thoroughbass realization, become “troped as musical motion,” and “henceforth 
[throughout the eighteenth century] accompany the perception and cognition of other 
progressions like a spectral presence, a vestige of the perfect model in the less-than-
perfect instances sometimes found in practice.”*# But the inertia of harmonic sequences 
                                                
77 For more on Newton’s Opticks and its reception in France, see Thomas Christensen, Rameau and 
Musical Thought in the Enlightenment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 143. 
 
78 Voltaire [François-Marie Arouet], Élémens de la philosophie de Newton (Paris: A. Neuchatel, 1738). 
 
79 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 117.  
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also engenders an empty Classical signification without the listening and feeling subject’s 
“bon goût” to mediate this metaphor for musical motion.    
In the Traité, a composer’s inegnium thus assumes intrinsic properties vis-à-vis 
music’s very structure: thoroughbass figures are not notes, and the performer does much 
of the work of executing these figures in his or her mind.'& As was the case of Rameau’s 
harmonic sequence, musical figures intertwine practice and theory in a fraught dialectic, 
with the composer’s “génie” enlisted to negotiate between the two processes.'" Similarly, 
the Cartesian system to which we might ascribe the Traité explicated well the mimetic 
models of seventeenth-century affect, which in many ways persisted into the eighteenth 
century despite the influence of Newtonian empiricism.'$ For musical practitioners like 
Rameau, Newton’s Opticks and the methodology it exemplified, though attractive 
                                                
80 “In the end, the imagination acts as a kind of interface between theory and practice, between the 
incomplete given and the complete created, between uninformed fact and informed possibility.” Moreno, 
Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 124.  
 
81 “We hardly see any rules that teach composition as it so well executed today; there is no man, even, 
confessing that his knowledge is owed to his experience only, skilled enough to achieve perfection in this 
manner; and cultivating this perfection in others, he is often forced in lessons to offer the following familiar 
proverb to other musicians: “practice makes perfect.” It is true that there are certain perfections that depend 
on genius and taste; as such, experience is more beneficial than science. But that doesn’t mean striving for 
perfection and knowledge should not still enlighten us, even when we fear that this experience might fool 
us. When we struggle to apply principles without acknowledging what effects they produce in us, we 
neglect to realize that this knowledge must be used to implement genius and taste. Without it, they would 
become but useless talents.” “On n'a point encore vû de regles qui enseignent la composition dans la 
perfection où elle est aujourd'hui; il n'y a pas même un habile homme dans ce genre, qui n'avouë 
sincerement qu'il doit presque toutes ses connoissances à sa seule experience; et lorsqu'il veut les procurer 
aux autres, il se trouve souvent contrains d'ajoûter à ses leçons ce Proverbe familier aux Musiciens, Caetera 
docebit usus. Il est vrai qu'il y a de certaines perfections qui dépendent du genie et du goût, ausquelles 
l'experience est encore plus avantageuse que la science même: Mais cela n'empêche pas qu'une parfaite 
connoissance ne doive toûjours nous éclairer, crainte que cette experience ne nous trompe; quand ce ne 
seroit que pour sçavoir appliquer à leur veritable principe, les nouveautez qu'elle pourroit nous faire 
produire: D'ailleurs cette parfaite connoissance sert à faire mettre en oeuvre le genie et le goût, qui sans elle 
deviendroient souvent des talens inutils.” Jean-Philippe Rameau, Traité de l’harmonie réduite à ses 
principes naturels (Paris: Ballard, 1722), Preface. 
 
82 “For eighteenth-century science, a certain amount of mathematical abstraction and disregard for physical 
evidence proved highly productive; by analyzing physical phenomena as a Cartesian problem of matter and 
impact, and quantifying such concepts as mass and force, the scientist may operate with a rigorous 
mathematical methodology without recourse to experimentation.” Christensen, Rameau, 157. 
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intellectual currency in Parisian academic circles, proved poor substitutes for the feeling 
subject’s intuition, and by extension, imagination. In response to Rousseau’s definitions 
for musical terms in Diderot’s Encyclopédie, for example, Rameau issued a compilation 
of errata and his corrections in a 1755 document entitled Erreurs sur la Musique dans 
l’Encyclopédie. In it, the composer levies serious complaints against the objectivity of 
pervasive empiricism as it pertained to music. He writes, 
When we discover that an interval exists in the same chord, or in two chords in 
the same key, this effect is nothing special unless it aids the actor. The interval 
from C to F-sharp, for example, can work equally well in quotes, questions, 
exclamations, affirmations, negations; but depending on the key, it is in that 
relationship that we feel—based on this same interval formed by these two 
pitches, mind you—almost innumerable expressions that might be found in such 
keys. These expressions can convey tenderness, sadness, sluggishness, 
frightfulness, pleasantry, joy, threat, horror, all depending on whether the interval 
of the fifth is formed above, or below, whether the key is major or minor, but only 
in a musical gesture appropriate for the situation.') 
 
Rameau’s investment in both representation and imagination in the Traité and the 
Erreurs therefore privileges not only the musical subject’s cognition, but more 
importantly, the subject’s own subjectivity. While Rameau does not directly address the 
issue of “fantaisie” as a compositional tactic in either document, his insistence on a 
dialogue between musical intuition and the science of harmony in thoroughbass 
realization implicates the feeling subject in nexus of musical hermeneutics. With the 
French Enlightenment’s zeal for empiricist taxonomy opposed to this interpretative act, 
                                                
83 “Dès qu’un intervalle éxiste dans le même accord, ou dans deux accords d'une même mode, son effet n’a 
rien particulier, si ce n'est qu'à l’aide de l’acteur, l’intervalle d’ut à fa diéze, par éxemple, peut servier à des 
apostrophes, interrogations, exclamations, affirmations, négations; mais lorsque le mode change d’un son à 
l'autre, c’est pour lors qu’on sent, dans le même intervalle formé par ces deux sons, presque autant de 
différentes expressions qu’il y a de rapport différents entre les deux modes qui s’y succédent, ces 
expressions tenant même du tendre, du triste, du lugubre, de l’affruex, de plaisant, du joyeux, du menaçant, 
de l'horrible selon que le passage se fait à la quinte au-dessus, ou au-dessous, et que les modes sont majeurs 
ou mineurs, en les secondant d'un mouvement convenable à la situation.” Jean-Philippe Rameau, Erreurs 
sur la Musique dans l’Encyclopédie (Paris: Jorry, 1755), 53. 
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the Traité presses against the Classical episteme. For the supposed “Newton of Music,” 
then, a composer’s genius or creativity could never be verified within any measurable 
musical paradigm—it was intrinsic to music’s very nature.  
The epistemological difficulty of this conflation of genius and subjectivity came 
to bear poignantly on issues concerning instrumental music in the eighteenth century. 
Instrumental music’s resistance to explication within any mimetic principles of the era (to 
say nothing of the more troubling matter of improvised instrumental music) was perhaps 
best summarized by the following entreaty, attributed to Bernard Le Bovier de 
Fontenelle, member of the French Académie: “Sonate, que me veux-tu?”'! 
Sonata, what do you want of me? The question, posed by the preeminent 
philosophe of his day, plagued a broad swath of music theorists and critics throughout the 
Enlightenment. With the publication of Alexander Baumgarten’s Meditationes (1735) 
and Aesthetica (1750), concern over non-mimetic musical meaning mounted in 
connection with the emergence of aesthetics as a discrete discipline in mid-eighteenth 
century Berlin.'% Without words to indicate feeling, Enlightenment thinkers wondered, 
could music really express anything?  
Many scholars (Descartes, Kircher, and Mattheson among them) explicated 
music’s expressiveness within the paradigm of semiotics in elaborate, though often 
insufficient structures of representation. Assisted to their expressive content by text and 
the Affektenlehre, musical topoi—including fantasia—emerge from these structures as 
                                                
84 For more on Fontenelle’s famed question, see Mary Sue Morrow, German Music Criticism in the Late 
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 4–6. 
 
85 Stefanie Buchenau, The Founding of Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment: The Art of Invention 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 122. 
 
 
 
54 
signs unto themselves. But with connections between a composer’s ingenium and systems 
of representation becoming ever more diffuse, the issue of a “fantasy” demanded 
revisiting.    
 In his aesthetic encyclopedia, the Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste (1771), 
Johann Georg Sulzer offered the following insight concerning matters of representation 
in poetry: 
Actually, the poet shows his object not as it exists in the world, but as his fertile 
genius depicts it, as his imagination adorns it, and how his sentimental heart still 
feels it, such that he can be free to enjoy it with us. We value the poet by scenes 
that occupy his imagination and heart, like scenes from Nature.'(   
 
In a peculiar reversal, Sulzer’s appraisal of a poet’s “empfindungsvolles Herz” would 
seem to trump representation, evoking a subjective sentimentality that, by extension, 
might be applied to other non-representational arts, like music. On the matter of 
instrumental music, however, Sulzer comes down against supposedly meaningless 
images, noting 
The invention of a concerto, trio, solo, sonata and the like, all of which have no 
specific purpose, is left almost entirely to chance. One can understand how a man 
of genius may arrive at some invention when he has something in front of himself 
that he can hold on to. But where it is not possible to say what he is to create, or 
what he should have in mind, then he seems to work only by good luck. … He 
can help himself by seeking out poetry that is pathetic, fiery, or tender in nature, 
and declaim it in an appropriate tone, and after that sketch out his composition 
following this sentiment. He must never forget that music that expresses no kind 
of passion or sentiment in a comprehensible language is nothing but sheer noise.'* 
 
                                                
86 “Denn eigentlich zeigt der Dichter seinen Gegenstand nicht, wie er in der Welt vorhanden ist, sondern 
wie sein fruchtbares Genie ihn bildet, wie seine Phantasie ihn schmückt, und was sein empfindungsvolles 
Herz noch dabei empfindet, lässt er uns mit genießen. Wir sehen durch ihn mehr die Szenen, die seine 
Phantasie und sein Herz beschäftigen als Szenen der Natur.” Johann Georg Sulzer, “Poesie,” in Allgemeine 
Theorie der Schönen Künste, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Weidmann: 1792), 620. 
 
87 Sulzer, “Instrumental Music,” in Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste, 670. Trans. Thomas 
Christensen, Aesthetics and the Art of Musical Composition in the German Enlightenment, ed. Nancy 
Kovaleff Baker and Thomas Christensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 97. 
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By Sulzer’s definition, instrumental music was empty signification without representation 
to govern its meaning. By extension, the free musical fantasia as Baroque topos—its 
improvisatory pedigree conflated with this dissolution of Classical semiotics—might 
likewise be considered a distorted type of mimesis. Predicated on the listener’s 
expectations, the fantasia was designed to reflect the caprices of human imagination as an 
outward-mandated rather than inward-driven force.88 
Curiously, however, the allure of improvisatory or improvisation-inspired 
performance as a function of a type of musical Einbuldingskraft coalesced with the 
fantasia into a peculiar duality in the late-eighteenth century—an almost occult 
conception of genius mired in an obsessive devotion to musical introspection. Annette 
Richards postulates a gendered interpretation of eighteenth-century An die Clavier songs 
as a manifestation of this empfindsamer Stil’s dichotomy. “[The clavichord] and its 
songs,” she writes, “suited both the confines of female domesticity as well as the 
curiously repressive emotionalism of the contemporary culture of sensibility, with its 
version of the male hero the effeminate and tearful Man of Sentiment.”89 No better 
eighteenth-century hero could be found than C.P.E. Bach, whose “improvisations at the 
clavichord and fortepiano contributed not a little to his status as North Germany’s 
                                                
88 “The same may be true of such improvisatory keyboard genres as the sixteenth-century fantasia and 
ricercare, of the nineteenth-century prelude and rhapsody. Conversely, the purpose of improvised fugues, 
variations, and fantasias on given material, in the eighteenth century, was surely that listeners should 
evaluate the performer’s skill on the terms of written compositions. In this sense, improvisation and 
composition can also be viewed, over and above the strictly technical distinction between them, as musical 
styles distinguished by the degree to which they give the appearance of performative spontaneity or 
authorial planning.” Bruno Nettl, et al., “Improvisation,” Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press, 
accessed May 29, 2014, http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/13738pg2. 
 
89 Annette Richards, The Free Fantasia and the Musical Picturesque (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 170. 
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greatest musical Originalgenie.”90 Richards continues her analysis by recounting 
Burney’s famous description of one of C.P.E. Bach’s tour-de-force, supposedly ex 
tempore performances of a free musical fantasia, in which the composer “became 
animated and possessed ‘drops of effervescence distilled from his countenance.’”91 This 
manifestation of C.P.E. Bach’s genius as perspiration bespeaks an eighteenth-century 
fascination with the creative process, and this process’s subsequent resistance to 
explication within the paradigm of Cartesian reasoning.92 
C.P.E. Bach’s ingenuity, its chief musical outlet the composer’s highly regarded 
free fantasias, would also seem to operate in contrast to matters of representation, like 
Sulzer’s poet and the execution of Rameau’s thoroughbass. In a review of Bach’s 1779 
Clavier-Sonaten für Kenner und Liebhaber, for example, Johann Schulz (who penned 
several articles for Sulzer’s encyclopedia) marveled at “the inexhaustibility of the 
sublime [Bach’s] ideas and the wealth of his Phantasie, which seems to renew itself in 
every new work.”#) However, in his own composition manual, the Versuch über die 
wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen from 1762, C.P.E. Bach had cautioned his reader 
against fantastical harmonic modulations that were too far-flung, and offered concrete 
musical examples of appropriate and tasteful means of moving from one key to another. 
The composer summarized the free musical fantasia thus: 
                                                
90 Richards, The Free Fantasia, 56.  
 
91 Ibid. 
 
92 Such pronouncements, Richards notes, “borrowed the vocabulary of contemporary theories of genius, as 
the entranced musician generated a sweat that seemed almost to be a condensation of inspiration itself.” 
Ibid. 
 
93 Review of C.P.E. Bach’s Clavier=Sonaten und freye Fantasien nebst einigen Rondos fürs Fortepiano für 
Kenner und Liebhaber, Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek LXXII/1 (1787), 165. In Morrow, German Music 
Criticism, 136. 
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A fantasy is called free when it contains no regular distribution of bars, and  
modulates to more keys than is usual in other kinds of pieces which are either 
composed or improvised in a regular meter.94  
 
Unlike the definitions of the French Académie, C.P.E. Bach’s conceptualization of the 
fantasia makes no mention of a “beheizt” imagination; the focus of this portion of the 
composer’s treatise is, by contrast, entirely devoted to the genre’s reasonable notation. He 
continues, 
A free fantasy consists of varied harmonic passages which can be executed in all 
kinds of figures and divisions. In doing so, one must establish a key with which to 
begin and end. Although no meter is established in such fantasies, the ear 
nevertheless demands a certain proportion in the alternation and duration of the 
harmonies among themselves … the eye a relation in the note values, so that 
one’s ideas can be written down.95 
   
The significance of C.P.E. Bach’s introduction of the synecdochic “Ohr” and “Auge” into 
the music-theoretical discourse in his Versuch indicates a change in eighteenth-century 
philosophy, and is reminiscent of the epistemological reassessment Jairo Moreno reads in 
Gottfried Weber’s own Versuch of 1832.96 Theoretically, though, by C.P.E. Bach’s 
understanding, we are still wedded to the indissoluble relationship between compositional 
                                                
94 “Eine Fantasie nennet man frey, wenn sie keine abgemessene Tacteintheilung enthält, und in mehrere 
Tonarten ausweichet, als bey andern Sücken zu geschehen pfleget, welche nach einer Tacteintheilung 
gesetzet sind, oder aus dem Stegreif erfunden werden.” Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, Versuch über die 
wahre Art das Clavier zu spielen, 2. Theil. (Berlin: George Ludewig, 1762). English translation in Carl 
Philipp Emanuel Bach, Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments, trans. William J. Mitchell 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1948), 430. 
 
95 “Eine freye Fantasie bestehet aus abwechselnden harmonischen Sätzen, welche in allerhand Figuren und 
Zergliederungen ausgeführet werden können. Man muß hierbey eine Tonart festsetzen, mit welcher man 
anfänget und endiget. Ohngeachtet in solchen Fantasien keine Tacteintheilung Statt findet, so verlanget 
dennoch das Ohr, wie wir weiter unten hören werden, ein gewisses Verhältniß in der Abwechselung und 
Dauer der Harmonien unter sich, und das Auge ein Verhältniß in der Geltung der Noten, damit man seine 
Gedanken aufschrieben könne.” English translation in Mitchell, Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard 
Instruments, 434. 
 
96 Moreno, Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects, 131. 
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gesture and affect, as manifested in his own notated representation of the free musical 
fantasia (a fantasia accompanies the Versuch; see Figure 5.3).  
 
Figure 5.3, C.P.E. Bach, Fantasia in D major, Wq. 117/14, H. 160 (ca. 1763) 
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Like Louis Couperin’s Prélude non mesuré, the fantastical nature of C.P.E. Bach’s 
notation is situated uneasily between visual stimulus and perceived musical message. By 
the composer’s estimation, true artistry could only be ascertained by the composer via the 
negotiation of this dialectic, whereupon, “what an endless vista of harmonic variety 
unfolds before us!”97 As such, Bach’s definition of fantasia in the Versuch, coupled with 
the composer’s notated example, might be considered attempts to distill meaning from a 
musical semiotics on the verge of collapse.  
By the late-eighteenth century, composition treatises like C.P.E. Bach’s Versuch 
were outpaced by an influx of music criticism and the growth of a musical consumer 
culture. Mary Sue Morrow notes that by this time, 
Creative genius, in all its manifestations, from simple invention to the imagination 
and Phantasie, had completely captured the market … More than two decades of 
emphasis on originality, novelty, and individual style had definitely had an effect, 
so that instrumental composition without them (however they were defined) could 
not hope for success with the musical public.#'  
 
The 1796 Essay on Musical Harmony of A.F.C. Kollmann, a student of Johann Philipp 
Kirnberger, presents a positing of musical policies and procedures similar to C.P.E. 
Bach’s Versuch that belies the period’s cult of sentimentality: “The rules of harmony 
must be observed,” Kollmann insists. “Fixed measure must be understood,” “modulation 
must not be so free as to be without any plan,” and so forth.99 Subsequently in the Essay, 
Kollmann inserts a composer’s Phantasie into the construction of the free fantasia, and in 
turn, subverts it. “Though it is impossible to teach a person what he shall fancy,” the 
                                                
97 C.P.E. Bach, Essay on the True Art of Playing Keyboard Instruments, trans. Mitchell, 438. 
 
98 Morrow, German Music Criticism, 137. 
 
99 Augustus Frederic Christopher Kollmann, An Essay on Musical Harmony (London, 1796), 121. 
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author writes, “this fancy may be assisted in taking a proper, or prevented from taking an 
improper direction, by certain rules.”100  
The commercial demand for musical inventiveness and, by extension, the 
associated concepts of introspection, sentimentality, and female domesticity, intensified 
near the end of the eighteenth century. In epistemological contrast to this shift, the free 
musical fantasia Baroque topos as Kollmann and C.P.E. Bach conceived it had ossified 
into a notated, rationalized musical conceit. In the following section, I offer two case 
studies—examples of early fantastic narratives—that invoke musical improvisation as a 
function of the construction of gender. In connection with eighteenth-century 
technological advancements and the Enlightenment’s aspirational ethos, the intersection 
of literary and musical fantasia around the year 1800 interfaces with the Classical 
episteme’s realization of the limits of representation and taxonomy. This convergence 
plays out in literary depictions of women making music.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
100 Kollmann, An Essay on Musical Harmony, 120. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LE DIABLE AMOUREUX AND DER SANDMANN:  
THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION 
 
In Descartes’ Traité de l’homme (1664), the author writes, 
I suppose the body to be nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which 
God forms with the explicit intention of making it as much as possible like us. 
Thus God not only gives it externally the colours [sic.] and shapes of all the parts 
of our bodies, but also places inside it all the parts required to make it walk, eat, 
breathe, and indeed to imitate all those of our functions which can be imagined to 
proceed from matter and to depend solely on the disposition of our organs."&" 
 
Descartes’ description of human physiology in mechanistic terms is a peculiarity of his 
mind-body dualism. As shown in the preceding sections, the mathesis that resulted from 
his rationalism defined emotion in biological relationships—the affections—and 
engendered an epistemological taxonomic impulse across a variety of disciplines, 
including music. Roughly a century after Descartes’ posthumous Traité was published, 
Johann Gottfried von Herder initiated the following reassessment of musical science, 
questioning the technological worldview that had come to pervade issues of human 
sensibility in the eighteenth century: 
So we do not have a science of music? Who would suspect that? The Eulers and 
d’Alemberts and Diderots and Mersennes and Gravesandes and Sauveurs have 
brought the physics and mathematics of music to a degree of perfection that only 
the optics of colors has been able to attain. They have computed the varying 
                                                
101 “Je suppose que le corps n’est autre chose qu’une statue ou machine de terre, que Dieu forme tout 
exprès, pour la rendre la plus semblable à nous qu’il est possible: en sorte que, non seulement il lui donne 
au dehors la couleur et la figure de tous nos membres, mais aussi qu’il met au dedans toutes les pièces qui 
sont requises pour faire qu’elle marche, qu’elle mange, qu’elle respire, et enfin qu’elle imite toutes celles 
de nos fonctions qui peuvent être imaginées procéder de la matière, et ne dépendre que de la disposition des 
organes.” René Descartes, Traité de l’homme (Paris: Angot, 1664), 1. English translation as “Treatise of 
Man,” in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothof, and Dugald 
Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1. 
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number of a string’s vibrations according to its length, strength, and weight, and 
on this basis they have calculated tones and hence the relations of tones and hence 
harmony and hence the rules of composition right up to the level of algebra. … 
Conversely, who is not familiar with the excellent practical guides to the arts of 
hearing that Germans in particular have, in their own way raised almost to the 
same exalted heights? … Both ends of musical science, the most abstract part 
above and the practical part below, are therefore perfect. But is there nothing in 
between? I think there is indeed! And it in this vast and empty middle ground that 
we shall find the as-yet-undeveloped portion we were seeking."&$ 
 
Herder’s entreaty speaks on behalf of late-eighteenth century philosophers and 
aestheticians, whose dictionaries and encyclopedias strained to convey adequate meaning 
under the constraints of representation. If neither music’s science nor its practice were 
sufficiently capable of explaining why music can stir our passions, what semiotics could 
be discerned from the fact that music—and more troublingly, music without words—
could be beautiful and moving? 
 In response to this question, the “empty middle ground” Herder uncovers is an apt 
point of reflection. Around the year 1800, the alterity of musical extemporaneity, already 
gendered female by this time, assumes prominent focus in texts that themselves limn the 
space between the real and the imaginary. This liminal space, in Foucault’s analysis, had 
already been the site of an epistemological upheaval, in which Renaissance resemblances 
gave way to the technologizing of the written word. Meaning in the modern episteme, he 
contends, using Cervantes’ Don Quixote as an example, is likewise found in the space 
between sign and signification. “Don Quixote’s truth,” Foucault writes, “is not in the 
relation of the words to the world but in that slender and constant relation woven between 
themselves by verbal signs. The hollow fiction of epic exploits has become the 
                                                
102 Johann Gottfried von Herder, “Critical Forests: Fourth Grove,” in Selected Writings on Aesthetics, trans. 
Gregory Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 236. 
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representative power of language. Words have swallowed up their own nature as signs.”"&) 
We might even say that modernity itself, initiated by print technology and amplified by 
cognition, revels in metaphysical interstices, made legible only in the understanding of 
their limitations and ultimate dissolution.  
 The literary fantastic, defined by Diderot and d’Alembert in their Encyclopédie as 
“the disordering of the imagination or the debauch of genius,” had by 1761 come to 
connote fragmentation, evocative, perhaps, of this epistemological acknowledgment. “It 
is that assemblage,” they continue, “of the most distant genres and of the most disparate 
forms, without progression, without proportion, [and] without nuance.”"&! Significantly, 
the musical fantastic topos and its extemporal façade, absorbed by this time into music as 
a sign unto itself, was likewise uneasily positioned in Herder’s “empty middle ground,” 
between music’s science (or notation, even) and its practice. The fragmentation that 
characterized the free fantasia—its seemingly random concatenations of tempo, meter, 
harmony, and affect that were so resisted by C.P.E. Bach and Kollmann in their 
treatises—became layered with additional meaning in concordance with language. Freed 
from their categorization within the fantasia as musical genre (like resemblances from 
their words in Don Quixote), these parameters achieve a new symbology in their 
depiction in literature vis-à-vis technology: as caprice, as sentiment, and as femininity. It 
                                                
103 Foucault, The Order of Things, 48. 
 
104 “Le déréglement de l’imagination, ou, si l’on veut, la débauche du génie n’a eu que la barriere des 
convenances à franchir. Le premier étoit le mélange des especes voisines; le second est l’assemblage des 
genres les plus éloignés & des formes les plus disparates, sans progressions, sans proportions, & sans 
nuances.” Diderot and d’Alembert, “Fantastique,” Encyclopédie, 6:682. Translation in Deborah A. Harter, 
Bodies in Pieces: Fantastic Narrative and the Poetics of Fragment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1996), 133. 
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is thus around 1800 in the limitations of representation that fantaisie and fantastique were 
synthesized. 
  In what follows, we will see how the liminal space in which the fantastic topos 
and female music making became intertwined corresponds to the growing trench between 
words and their meanings throughout the representational episteme. The ternary structure 
formed by the connections between improvisation, femininity, and machines is thus 
coopted by the fantastic narrative to signify otherness and the dissolution of the Classical 
sign. Depictions of musical performances by women in Cazotte’s Le Diable amoureux 
(1772) and E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann (1816), presented here as prototype and 
archetype of the literary fantastic respectively, signal a cultural reassessment of 
extemporaneity and ingenium. Texts like these highlight and, one might say, satirize the 
Enlightenment’s link between technology and sentiment along with their presentation of 
this same technology’s curiosity and failings.  
Terry Castle notes that the disparate notions of calculable, empirical data (that 
which could be measured) and human behavior (that which could not be measured) had 
by the late-seventeenth century converged in the invention and subsequent ubiquity of 
weatherglasses. “On the most abstract level,” she writes,  
Traditional theories describing the effect of weather on human nature provided a 
philosophical basis for connecting human emotions with the state of the air … 
Even more influential, perhaps, in fixing this connection with human psychology 
was the purported resemblance between the fluctuations of the mercury in the 
weatherglass and the recently discovered movements of the blood in the 
bloodstream.105 
 
                                                
105 Terry Castle, The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth-Century Culture and the Invention of the Uncanny 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 26. 
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Parallels between the measurable and immeasurable like these suggest to us that 
Enlightenment thinkers believed that science had the capacity to explicate the subtleties 
of human nature. This, in turn, meant that those subtleties were not so readily 
quantified,106 including gender difference, quickly became the subject of lore and fantasy. 
One such manifestation of the attempt to quantify human nature presents in the depiction 
of Bonnell Thornton’s “Female Thermometer” from the essayist’s entry in a 1754 issue 
of The Connoisseur. Terry Castle summarizes: “Perfected by an ‘ingenious friend,’ the 
Female Thermometer was an invention for measuring ‘the exact temperature of a lady’s 
passions.’ The calibrations [from ‘hottest’ to ‘coldest’] were as follows: Abandoned 
impudence, Gallantry, Loose Behaviour [sic.], Innocent Freedoms, Indiscretions, 
Inviolable Modesty.”107 
As such, the epistemological realization of the limits of representation, 
empiricism, and taxonomy—and, by extension, technology—reified throughout the 
course of the Enlightenment, came by the dawn of the nineteenth century to be depicted 
in fictional accounts of technology gone mad.108 In E.T.A. Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann 
from 1816, for example, in which the protagonist witnesses a musical performance by a 
female automaton, the author writes,  
Olimpia played the piano with great dexterity and, with equal skill, performed a 
bravura aria in a bright, almost cutting voice resembling musical glasses. 
Nathanael was totally enraptured; he stood in the back row and could not 
                                                
106 Indeed, what Foucault calls “those never entirely representable representations.” The Order of Things, 
244. 
 
107 Terry Castle, The Female Thermometer, 21. 
 
108 “The last years of the eighteenth century are broken by a discontinuity similar to that which destroyed 
Renaissance thought at the beginning of the seventeenth; then, the great circular forms in which similitude 
was enclosed were dislocated and opened so that the table of identities could be unfolded; and that table is 
now about to be destroyed in turn.” Foucault, The Order of Things, 217. 
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recognize Olimpia’s features perfectly in the dazzling candlelight. Therefore, 
completely unnoticed, he pulled out Coppola’s glass and directed it at the 
beautiful Olimpia. Ah!—then he became aware that she was looking at him in 
deep longing, that each note of hers only attained full clarity when combined with 
that loving look which pierced and inflamed his heart.109 
  
Here, we witness a twofold commentary on musical technology: Nathanael’s beloved 
Olimpia, a technological construction, beguiles with her tour-de-force performance at the 
piano, itself a machine and signifier of expression. To this, I add Nathanael’s usage of a 
glass, a technological manifestation of the proverbial “male gaze,” through which the 
reader may, too, assume a voyeuristic position in this feminine-as-technology 
figuration.110 
The reflexivity of Hoffmann’s depiction of Olimpia the automaton, insofar as she 
becomes the object of Nathanael’s obsessive adoration and is ultimately destroyed by it, 
is evocative of the metaphysical dissolution of the Classical episteme in the face of 
modernity. As Hoffmann's Olimpia is shown to be a mere “lifeless doll,”111 subverting, in 
a sense, her human representation, so does Nathanael’s representation within the literary 
paradigm reach its own limitations; the tale catapults to its conclusion, ending with the 
protagonist’s madness, death, and his expulsion from the narrative. Tzvetan Todorov 
                                                
109 “Olimpia spielte den Flügel mit großer Fertigkeit und trug ebenso eine Bravour-Arie mit heller, beinahe 
schneidender Glasglockenstimme vor. Nathanael war ganz entzückt; er stand in der hintersten Reihe und 
konnte im blendenden Kerzenlicht Olimpias Züge nicht ganz erkennen. Ganz unvermerkt nahm er deshalb 
Coppolas Glas hervor und schaute hin nach der schönen Olimpia. Ach! - da wurde er gewahr, wie sie voll 
Sehnsucht nach ihm herübersah, wie jeder Ton erst deutlich aufging in dem Liebesblick, der zündend sein 
Inneres durchdrang.” Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann, Der Sandmann (1816). Original German and 
English translation in Stanley Appelbaum, “The Sand-Man,” Five Great German Short Stories = Fünf 
Deutsche Meistererzählungen, (New York: Dover, 1993), 82–83. 
 
110 Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” Screen 16:3 (Autumn 1975), 6–18. 
 
111 “Erstarrt stand Nathanael - nur zu deutlich hatte er gesehen, Olimpias toderbleichtes Wachsgesicht hatte 
keine Augen, statt ihrer schwarze Höhlen; sie war eine leblose Puppe.” Hoffmann, Der Sandmann (1816) 
in Stanley Appelbaum, “The Sand-Man,” Five Great German Short Stories, 94–95. 
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identifies this type of rupture in Hoffmann as the site of literary fantasy. He writes, “‘I 
nearly reached the point of believing’: that is the formula which sums up the spirit of the 
fantastic. Either total faith or total incredulity would lead us beyond the fantastic: it is 
hesitation which sustains its life.”112 Technology, manifested as a female curiosity 
(poignantly reminiscent of the sixteenth-century courtesan), becomes in Hoffmann’s 
narrative intertwined with the male protagonist’s unraveling; in both instances, the 
connoting of the inexplicable is relegated to the realm of fantasy. 
A similar example of this technophobia appears in Cazotte’s Le Diable amoureux, 
wherein the notions of musical improvisation, genius, and technology converge in the 
portrayal of Biondetta, the devil-as-woman, and her homemade harpsichord. Biondetta’s 
position in the narrative represents a changing conception of technology as it pertained to 
man’s undoing (if not simply the undoing of masculinity) at the close of the 
Enlightenment and the dawn of the Romantic era. As such, Terry Castle notes, “We 
might speak of the feminization of human nature itself [at this time] … Characteristics 
once seen as belonging only to women—moodiness, heightened sensitivity, susceptibility 
to hysteria, and so on—come increasingly to be perceived as belonging to both sexes.”113  
Toward the end of the novel, Biondetta experiences a bout of melancholia that, in 
turn, becomes linked with her subconscious (as manifested by her “dreamlike state,” as 
Cazotte writes), and which takes the form of a musical improvisation. Cazotte juxtaposes 
the curiosity of Biondetta’s extemporal performance—on a harpsichord of her own 
construction—with the courtesan’s emotional upheaval. In so doing, the author interlaces 
                                                
112 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, trans. Richard Howard 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), 31. 
 
113 Terry Castle, The Female Thermometer, 34. 
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the inexplicability of human psychology (as represented by womanly sentiment) with a 
generalized technophobia. Cazotte writes,  
Passion overtook her, and her tears appeared to suffocate her. She gets up, goes to 
take a handkerchief, wipes [her nose] and approaches the instrument; she wants to 
sit down again, but as she finds the low height of the seat to be bothersome, she 
takes the book that was on the stand, places it on the stool, sits down and preludes 
once more.114  
 
Poignantly, Alvaro’s observing this gesture through a keyhole—a vantage point 
that simultaneously engenders a sexual-ideological construct, and is reminiscent of, 
perhaps, the assumed posture of a scientist using a microscope—is what anticipates this 
reconfiguration of gender roles. After he flees from the keyhole, acknowledging the 
fantastic nature of Biondetta’s performance, the protagonist witnesses the courtesan’s 
attempted murder, whereupon he descends into his own type of effeminate despair. He 
exclaims,  
Once she was undressed and I saw this beautiful, bleeding body afflicted by two 
enormous wounds that seemed surely to attack both sources of life, I said and did 
a thousand extravagances. Biondetta, presumably unconscious, must not have 
heard them; but the innkeeper and his men, a surgeon, and two doctors judged it 
too dangerous to leave me near the wounded woman. They took me out of the 
room. They left my men near me; but one of them having the indecency to tell me 
that his faculties had determined her wounds to be fatal, I let out shrill cries. 
Finally fatigued by my outburst, I fell into a despondency that was followed by 
sleep.115 
 
                                                
114 “La passion l’emportait, et les larmes semblaient la suffoquer. Elle se lève, va prendre un mouchoir, 
s’essuie et se rapproche de l’instrument; elle veut se rasseoir, et, comme si le peu de hauteur du siège l’eût 
tenue ci-devant dans une attitude trop gênée, elle prend le livre qui était sur son pupitre, le met sur le 
tabouret, s’assied et prélude de nouveau.” Cazotte, Le Diable amoureux, 79. 
 
115 “Quand on l’eut déshabillée, quand je vis ce beau corps sanglant atteint de deux énormes blessures, qui 
semblaient devoir attaquer toutes deux les sources de la vie, je dis, je fis mille extravagances. Biondetta, 
présumée sans connaissance, ne devait pas les entendre; mais l’aubergiste et ses gens, un chirurgien, deux 
médecins, appelés, jugèrent qu’il était dangereux pour la blessée qu’on me laissât auprès d’elle. On 
m’entraîna hors de la chambre. On laissa mes gens près de moi; mais un d’eux ayant eu la maladresse de 
me dire que la faculté avait jugé les blessures mortelles, je poussai des cris aigus. Fatigué enfin par mes 
emportements, je tombai dans un abattement qui fut suivi du sommeil.” Ibid., 86. 
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Biondetta’s near-death coincides with a scientific, “indecent” diagnosis of her 
mortality, one that is ultimately subverted by the narrative’s fantastic nature: she lives. 
Alvaro’s femininity, in turn, rises and falls as the courtesan wavers between life and 
death in Cazotte’s narrative. “If you die, object most worthy of being cherished,” the 
protagonist remarks,  
and I not having recognized your gifts, I do not want to survive you. … If you are 
returned to me, I will be yours; I will recognize your kindnesses; I will crown 
your virtues, your patience, I am bound by indissoluble ties, and will do my duty 
to make you happy by the blind sacrifice of my feelings and wishes.116  
 
Alvaro’s self-effacing comments in the face of Biondetta’s potential expulsion from the 
narrative, therefore, reverse the two characters’ initial power dynamic. Biondetta’s 
survival causes Alvaro to become hysterical, delirious, and even paranoid in a “swoon of 
[womanly] tenderness”117 as the courtesan regains her physical strength.  
With this, we are reminded of the literal deconstruction of Hoffmann’s Olimpia at 
the end of Der Sandmann as it pertains to Nathanael’s masculinity. In a sense, Hoffmann 
hinges Nathanael’s fate and, ultimately, the fate of all men on the technological failure of 
the protagonist’s beloved Olimpia. The author writes, “The history of this automaton had 
sunk deeply into [men’s] souls, and an absurd mistrust of human figures began to prevail. 
Several lovers required that their mistress should sing and dance a little out of time, 
                                                
116 “Si tu meurs, objet le plus digne d’être chéri, et dont j’ai si indignement reconnu les bontés, je ne veux 
pas te survivre. Je mourrai après avoir sacrifié sur ta tombe la barbare Olympia! Si tu m’es rendue, je serai 
à toi; je reconnaîtrai tes bienfaits; je couronnerai tes vertus, ta patience, je me lie par des liens indissolubles, 
et ferai mon devoir de te rendre heureuse par le sacrifice aveugle de mes sentiments et de mes volontés.” 
Cazotte, Le Diable amoureux, 89. 
 
117 Ibid. 
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should embroider or knit or play with her little pug, etc.”118 Nathanael’s death, then, 
becomes a literary representation of his character’s inability (even, perhaps, the inability 
of mankind) to exist within the episteme of rationalized thought and Classical signs: his 
“total faith” in Olimpia, to invoke Todorov, effeminizes him while his “total incredulity” 
engenders his madness.119  
Descartes’ proclamation that “the body [is] nothing but a statue or machine made 
of earth” attains a new poignancy at the dawn of the Romantic era. The two-
dimensionality of this physiology—that like cogs in clockwork, bodily organs have 
singular functions with singular results—resounds in a haunting echo in Olimpia’s 
roulades and Biondetta’s prelude. As tangible and earthly machines, the harpsichord and 
Olimpia, who meet their eventual destruction and fragmentation within the literary 
paradigm via a revealing of their limitations, invite the dissolution of the Classical sign: 
two dimensions become three. The liminal space occupied by a pairing of musical 
fantasia—itself characterized by fragmentary “capriciousness”—and female music 
making becomes a reflection of the gap between natural signs and their meanings. 
Herder’s “empty middle ground” may therefore be filled with musical symbols extrinsic 
to their affective capabilities or reasonable execution; in the modern episteme, they 
become metaphors.               
 
                                                
118 “Aber viele hochzuverehrende Herren beruhigten sich nicht dabei; die Geschichte mit dem Automat 
hatte tief in ihrer Seele Wurzel gefaßt und es schlich sich in der Tat abscheuliches Mißtrauen gegen 
menschliche Figuren ein. Um nun ganz überzeugt zu werden, daß man keine Holzpuppe liebe, wurde von 
mehrern Liebhabern verlangt, daß die Geliebte etwas taktlos singe und tanze, daß sie beim Vorlesen sticke, 
stricke, mit dem Möpschen spiele usw.” Hoffmann, Der Sandmann (1816) in Appelbaum, “The Sand-
Man,” Five Great German Short Stories, 96–97. 
 
119 Tzvetan Todorov, The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, 31. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
Using Hoffmann’s Olimpia and Cazotte’s Biondetta as case studies, I have drawn 
a connection between the literary fantastic and the eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-
century conceptualization of female music making. To wit, I cite the Enlightenment’s 
codification of the free musical fantasia in the documents of French philosophes and 
German music theorists as some examples of a generation of thinkers anxiously 
reconciling extemporal performance with rationalized, notated music. Around 1800, 
lingering concerns over inexplicable, unclassifiable musical fantasy become intertwined 
with “feminine music as other,” which is, in turn, signified by a growing technophobia. 
This is due to an acknowledgement of the limits of representation and taxonomy, a 
cultural awareness of the subconscious, and a fascination with musical ingenium.  
Hoffmann’s disquisition on Beethoven’s instrumental music, which appeared in 
1814 in Die Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung as part of the author’s Kreisleriana essays, 
is an appropriate point of arrival for this trajectory. As a sensitive music critic, a 
composer, and author of some of the Romantic period’s most treasured tales, Hoffmann 
embodied the Zeitgeist of the early-nineteenth century, and leaves to us ample 
documentation of the era’s epistemological turn. “The genuine artist,” he proclaimed, 
throws himself into the work, which he first comprehends from the point-of-view 
of the composer, and then interprets. He scorns the exploitation of his personality 
in any way whatever, and all his poetic imagination and intellectual understanding 
are bent towards the object of calling forth into active life, with all the brilliant 
colors at his command, the noble and enchanting images and visions which the 
Master with magic power has shut up in his work, that they may surround 
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mankind in bright sparkling rings and, enflaming his fancy and his innermost 
feelings, carry him in wild flights into the distant spirit kingdom of sound."$&   
 
Like the author’s Olimpia, imbued with “active life” by Spalanzani within the literary 
paradigm, so does Olimpia’s meaning—as the site on which representation is projected 
and destroyed—hinge on Hoffmann’s command of “noble and enchanting images.” This 
fantasy, with the linguistic signification of image at its core, once the imaginative 
impulse of the composer bridled by representation and taxonomy, becomes in 
Hoffmann’s interpretation the very essence of freedom; “innermost feelings” assume 
primacy over outward-mandated mathesis.    
By the time Freud published his article on the uncanny in 1919, some one 
hundred years after the publication of Hoffmann’s fantastic narrative, the 
Enlightenment’s peculiar inexplicability of Olimpia—namely Nathanael’s discovery of 
the automaton’s mechanical eyes lying on the ground next to her—becomes even more 
poignantly associated with demasculinization. Freud writes, “a study of dreams, 
phantasies and myths has taught us that a morbid anxiety connected with the eyes and 
with going blind is often enough a substitute for the dread of castration.”121 With this 
further turn away from the Classical sign, fantasy is supplanted by psychoanalysis; the 
representational regime disintegrates for good, and we find new explanation for what was 
previously relegated to the occult. Similarly, the nineteenth century ushered in a new age 
for musical aesthetics, as Mark Evan Bonds notes, “All aesthetic contemplation, 
                                                
120 Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann, “Beethoven’s Instrumental Music from ‘Kreisleriana,’” trans. 
Arthur Ware Locke, The Musical Quarterly 3:1 (January 1917): 133. 
 
121 Sigmund Freud, “The Uncanny,” Imago Bd. V (Berlin, 1919). Translated by Alix Strachey in Sammlung 
Kleiner Schriften zur Neurosenlehre, Fünfte Folge (Berlin: Internationaler Psychoanalystischer Verlag, 
1922), 7. 
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according to the idealist outlook, demanded imagination—Einbildungskraft—to mediate 
between the senses and the spirit, between the phenomenal and the noumenal worlds.”122 
In the modern era, then, the concept of the free fantasia undergoes its ultimate 
transformation, from the musical pastime of courtesans and dilettantes, to the stylistic 
calling cards and flourishes of musical geniuses and virtuosi.  
 
                                                
122 Mark Evan Bonds, “Idealism and the Aesthetics of Instrumental Music at the Turn of the Nineteenth 
Century,” Journal of the American Musicological Society 50:2/3 (Summer–Autumn 1997): 393. 
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